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INTRODUCTION
The law of nations, being the common law of the civilized world, may be
said, indeed, to be a part of the law of every civilized nation .... [T]his
universal common law can never cease to be the rule of executive and judi-
cial proceedings until mankind shall return to the savage state. 1
The United States of America is now an outlaw nation, and
there is nothing that the Supreme Court is willing to do about it.
This ugly state of affairs has been brought about, in great part, by
the 1992 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain.2
In that decision, the Supreme Court held that United States
courts are not stripped of personal jurisdiction over a defendant,
even when the defendant is a foreign citizen, and his presence in the
U.S. has been obtained through a governmentally sponsored forcible
abduction. Although the decision rested on strict adherence to an-
cient and dubious precedent, coupled with convoluted treaty inter-
pretation, the Court's conclusion ultimately forced it to ignore the
international law implications of such abductions, and conclude that
it was powerless to stop the executive branch from violating inter-
national law.
In essence, the Supreme Court refused to apply international
law in a case which cried out for it. Instead, the Court merely de-
clared that "the decision of whether respondent should be returned
to Mexico.. . is a matter for the Executive Branch."3 The executive
branch, for its part, elected to continue acting outside internation-
ally sanctioned behavior, and refused to return Alvarez-Machain to
Mexico.
1. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1122 n.6 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (quoting
Peter Duponceau, Attorney for Henfield).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
3. Id. at 2196.
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The Court's refusal to apply customary international law as a
means to invalidate illegal executive branch action is, unfortunately,
not surprising. Instead, Alvarez-Machain merely represents the
culmination of executive branch attempts to disentangle itself from
the restraining bonds of international prohibitions. 4 Although Al-
varez-Machain may be attacked for its poor treaty interpretation, or
for its-misuse of precedential support,5 it is its failure to apply cus-
tomary international law as a barrier to governmental impropriety
that is most reprehensible. Because of this failure, Alvarez-Machain
may soon come to represent the supreme judicial precedent author-
izing the executive branch to violate customary international law.
For this reason, the holding in Alvarez-Machain, and the historical
beliefs and barriers which allowed the Court to reach such an im-
moral and dangerous conclusion, must be reexamined. Part I of this
Article will review the factual background of the Alvarez-Machain
decision and discuss the holding of the Court. Part H will critically
examine the domestic precedents upon which the decision was
founded. In so doing, it will show that these precedents did not re-
quire the decision that the Court reached.
Part III will establish that the abduction of Alvarez-Machain
did in fact violate customary international law, but will note that
courts in the United States have become reluctant to apply that law
against the executive. Part IV will place the courts' reluctance in the
context of broad historical trends of jurisprudence. Part V will es-
tablish that, despite these trends, United States courts were origi-
nally intended to apply and enforce customary international law.
Finally, Part VI will address and refute some of the major theoreti-
cal arguments against a modern judicial application of customary
international law.
In the end, this Article will argue that customary international
law should be applied domestically against the executive, because to
do so is consistent with history and with the Constitution, and is in
the long-term international best interests of the United States.
4. See The Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Enforcement
Activities That Depart From International Law, in FBI Authority to Seize Suspects
Abroad: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) (Statement of William Barr, As-
sistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice)
[hereinafter Extraterritorial Enforcement Activities]; The International Law and Foreign
Policy Implications of Nonconsensual Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities: Hear-
ings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989) (Statement of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor
for the United States Department of State) [hereinafter International Law].
5. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197-206 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
1994]
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I. UNrTED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
On February 7, 1985, Drug Enforcement Agent Enrique (Kiki)
Camarena-Salazar was kidnapped outside the American consulate
in Guadalajara, Mexico. His mutilated and obviously tortured body
was found one month later. Although it was widely known that
Camarena's murder had been carried out by members of a Latin
American drug cartel, the Mexican government was unable to sat-
isfy the United States that it intended to convict those responsible.7
6. The 1985 kidnapping, torture, and subsequent murder of Drug Enforcement
Agency Special Agent Enrique (Kiki) Camarena-Salazar has been a source of extensive
litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); United
States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946
F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); Matta-Ballesteros ex. rel. Stolar v.
Henmen, 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ill. 1988), affd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
For a more extensive discussion of the facts surrounding Camarena-Salazar's mur-
der, see Storm Arises over Camarena: U.S. Wants Harder Line Adopted, LATIN AMI. WKLY.
REP., Mar. 8, 1985, at 10; see also ELAINE SHANNON, DESPERADOES, LATIN DRUG LORDS,
U.S. LAWMEN, AND THE WAR AMERICA CAN'T WIN (1989); Drug Wars: The Camarena Story
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 7-9, 1990).
For a series of scholarly works that are highly critical of the government's actions in
this area, see H. Moss Crystle, When Rights Fall in a Forest ... The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
and American Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial Abductions and Torture, 9 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 387 (1991); Jonathan Gentin, Government Sponsored Abduction of Foreign
Criminals Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero and the Inadequacy of
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Still More on
Kidnapping, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 655 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by Gov-
ernment Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990).
However, not every scholar disagreed with government sponsored abductions of for-
eign criminals. See Ruth Wedgwood et al., Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-Applicability of
Constitutional Restraints to U.S. Officials Acting Abroad-Searches by U.S. Officials of
Alien-Owned Premises in Foreign Country: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 747 (1990); Christopher A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The Legal
Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867 (1992);
Mitchell J. Matorin, Note, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction
in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907 (1992).
7. See Mexico's President Comes Calling, 132 CONG. REC. 11,462 (1986) (statement of
Sen. Hawkins):
The thing that rankles me most about Mexico is how it pussyfoots around
on the subject of drug trafficking and corruption in high places. Drug dealers
operate with impunity, without the slightest fear that they will be caught. And
if they are unlucky enough to be caught in one of the occasional nets Mexican
authorities cast from time to time, nothing ever happens. They are never prose-
cuted. They are released with at most a slap on the wrist.
Id.
Senator Hawkins' pessimism has proven to be premature. The Mexican government,
in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court, declared that:
Mexican authorities commenced a criminal investigation in 1985 into the
kidnapping and murder of DEA agent of Enrique Camarena Salazar and Alfredo
Zavala Avelar. Warrants of arrest were issued for Rafael Caro Quintero, Ern-
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Among those the United States felt were responsible was Dr. Hum-
berto Alvarez-Machain.8
Alvarez-Machain was suspected by the DEA of administering
life-sustaining treatment to Camarena, thereby preserving him for
further interrogation and torture. As a result, the United States
moved quickly to indict Alvarez-Machain for conspiracy to commit
violent acts in furtherance of an enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity,9 felony murder,10 conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent,"
kidnap of a federal agent, 2 and for being an accessory after the
fact."3
In December 1989, agents of the DEA met with Mexican
authorities to discuss the possibility of exchanging Alvarez-Machain
esto Foncesa Carrillo, and others in the state of Jalisco (Guadalajara) on
charges of illegal deprivation of freedom in the form of abduction, homicide, and
various narcotics offenses. They were charged with the offenses named on Sep-
tember 19, 1989, and were tried and convicted on December 12, 1989. The court
imposed the maximum penalty on both defendants, viz., 40 years imprisonment,
various fines, and forfeiture of properties. The convictions were affirmed on ap-
peal on August 10, 1990 by the Third District Criminal Court of the State of
Jalisco. Nine of their principal associates were also convicted and sentenced for
their complicity in the offenses.
In addition, Caro Quintero, Foncesa Carrillo and twenty-one of their asso-
ciates were convicted and sentenced in the Federal District (Mexico City) for
narcotics offenses, firearms offenses, criminal association and illegal deprivation
of freedom offenses. In that case, Caro Quintero was sentenced to a separate 34-
year prison term and Foncesa Carrillo was sentenced to a separate 11-112 year
term. Their twenty-one associates received sentences ranging from 12-12 to 14-
1/4 years, plus fines and forfeitures.
A third person, believed to be a principal in the Camarena case, Miguel
Angel Felix Gallardo, has also been arrested and is being tried, together with
nine of his associates, in the Federal District (Mexico City) for various narcotics
trafficking, firearms and bribery charges. They have been in custody since April
1989.
Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at n.24,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712), available in
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs fie.
From the preceding it becomes clear that the United States' opposition to Alvarez-
Machain's repatriation to Mexico for the reason that "immunizing a defendant from all
prosecution is too high a price to pay for an illegal arrest" is not based in fact. See Brief
for the United States at 17, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No.
91-712).
8. Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez and Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros were also
kidnapped and brought to the United States for trial. For a discussion of these abduc-
tions, see Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and
Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. IINL L. 151 (1991).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (1988).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114 (1988).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1988).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5) (1988).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
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for a Mexican, Isaac Naredo Moreno, who was being held in the
United States. The swap was to be made immediately after the
Christmas holiday. Unfortunately, when the time came, Mexican
authorities demanded an additional $50,000 before they would make
the exchange. The DEA refused, and the deal fell through. At this
point, the DEA began making plans to abduct Alvarez-Machain from
his home in Mexico.
The DEA decided it would hire former members of the Mexican
police to kidnap Alvarez-Machain and deliver him to United States
authorities in Texas. As an inducement, the DEA offered a reward of
$50,000 for the abduction and delivery.14 Finally, the plan was ap-
proved by the Deputy Director of the DEA and the United States
Attorney General's Office. 5
In the Spring of 1990, Dr. Alvarez-Machain had just finished
treating a patient when several armed men burst into his office and,
placing a gun against his head, ordered him to "cooperate or die."
Alvarez-Machain was driven to Leon, Mexico, quickly put on a
plane, and flown to El Paso, Texas. Upon landing, he was forced off
the plane and promptly arrested by United States federal authori-
ties.16
In the end, the plan to abduct Alvarez-Machain cost the DEA a
total of $25,000 in reward payments to the mercenaries who carried
out the kidnapping. The DEA also brought seven of the individuals
involved, and their families, to the United States, paying all of the
abductors' expenses, including living expenses, incurred during
their flight from Mexican authorities. All of this was done to protect
these "agents" of the United States government from lawful prose-
cution by Mexican authorities for the kidnapping of a Mexican citi-
zen in Mexican territory."
Soon after arriving in the United States, Alvarez-Machain
challenged his indictment, arguing principally that his abduction
was in clear violation of the extradition treaty between Mexico and
the United States. 8 The district court agreed and ordered that Al-
varez-Machain be returned to Mexico. 9 The Ninth Circuit Court of
14. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub
noma., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), reu'd, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 599-604; see also Gentin, supra note 6, at 1227.
17. All of the above facts are taken from the statement of facts as provided in the
Brief for the United States, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No.
91-712).
18. The Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and Mexico, May 4, 1978,
U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
19. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 614.
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Appeals affirmed the district court's decision,20 relying on its earlier
holding in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.
2 1
On July 15, 1992, the Supreme Court struck down the decision
of the Ninth Circuit,22 declaring that "[tihe fact of respondent's forc-
ible abduction does not... prohibit his trial in a court in the United
States for violations of the criminal laws of the United States."
23
The Court considered three relevant factors before determining
that Alvarez-Machain's abduction did not divest the courts of juris-
diction. First, it looked to Ker v. Illinois to find support for its con-
clusion that the manner in which a defendant is brought before a
court does not dispossess the court of jurisdiction. Second, it recon-
ciled Alvarez-Machain's abduction with the existing extradition
treaty. Finally, it implicitly held that any customary international
law prohibition against forcible abductions is a matter for the ex-
ecutive branch, and does not constitute a proper issue for judicial
determination.
In reality, the Court did not adequately address the range of is-
sues raised by Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping. A deeper analysis of
the cases and law discussed in the Court's opinion demonstrates the
inadequacy of the decision and makes clear that the Court's opinion
should be criticized on two levels. First, the domestic precedent upon
which the Court relies does not fully support the decision's conclu-
sions. Second, and most important, the majority's refusal to apply
customary international law, and its implicit endorsement of the
power of the executive branch to violate that law, is immoral, anti-
historical, and incompatible with the long-term international inter-
ests of the United States.
II. TBE COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF PRECEDENT
The Court's opinion in Alvarez-Machain rests largely on its in-
terpretation of two earlier Supreme Court decisions: United States v.
Rauscher and Ker v. Illinois, decided by the Court on the same day
in 1886. Put simply, the Court interpreted the two cases to mean the
following: Rauscher stands for the principle that a court has no ju-
risdiction over a defendant brought before it in violation of a treaty,
while Ker espouses that where no treaty is violated, due process does
20. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992).
21. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Rafeedie felt that the earlier holding in
Verdugo-Urquidez was dispositive of Alvarez-Machai's case. In particular, Judge
Rafeedie was swayed by the fact that a valid extradition treaty was in place and that the
offended country (Mexico) had protested the abduction, thus allowing Alvarez-Machain to
raise the treaty as a defense. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1466.
22. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
23. Id. at 2196.
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not bar trial of a defendant whose presence has been secured by
force, even if illegally.
Following these interpretations, the Court stated: "If we con-
clude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the
rule in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how respon-
dent came before it." 24 However, in using this reading, the Court
actually misapplied both Ker and Rauscher, failing to distinguish
the former, and erroneously distinguishing the latter. It then com-
pounded its error by failing to hold, or even to consider the argu-
ment, that the rule of Ker is obsolete in light of more recent devel-
opments in due process jurisprudence.
A. Applicability of the Treaty
1. Ker v. Illinois. Ker v. Illinois involved the forcible abduction
and repatriation to the United States of Frederick M. Ker, an
American citizen who had fled to Peru after embezzling from a bank
in Chicago.25 Henry G. Julian, a Pinkerton agent, was sent to take
custody of Ker from the Peruvian government in compliance with an
official extradition treaty between the two countries.2 6 Julian, how-
ever, never contacted the Peruvian government 7 and instead forc-
ibly abducted Ker from his home. Ker was transported to Illinois
where he was promptly convicted of embezzlement. 28
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Ker put forward two prin-
cipal arguments: first, that his abduction and treatment violated his
due process rights; and second, that the abduction was in contra-
vention of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Peru, and that the extradition treaty was the only legitimate means
of obtaining his presence from Peru. Since his presence was secured
outside of the procedures outlined in the treaty, Ker argued that the
Court had no legal jurisdication over him.
The Supreme Court rejected Ker's due process argument in
cursory fashion, noting simply that his trial in Cook County Crimi-
nal Court had met the necessary due process requirements of the
Constitution."0 The Court also rejected Ker's appeal to the treaty,
24. Id. at 2193.
25. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886).
26. Id. at 437-39. The treaty had been signed on Sept. 12, 1870, and had entered into
force on July 27, 1884. See Crystle, supra note 6, at 391 n.35.
27. Julian's failure to contact the Peruvian government may be explained by the fact
that when he arrived in Lima, the Peruvian government had been overthrown by Chile's
armed forces. See Editorial Comment, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 A. J. INT'L L. 678
(1953).
28. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 437-39.
29. Id. at 438-40.
30. Id. at 440 (stating that Ker "ha[d] a trial according to the forms and modes pre-
562 [Vol. 42
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holding that, because his abduction was carried out beyond its scope,
the treaty was not applicable, and he could not invoke its protec-
tion.3' According to the Court, a private abduction, performed with-
out the consent of the United States government, lay completely
outside the provisions and reach of the treaty.2
The Court refused to find sufficient governmental participation
despite the fact that the Pinkerton agent was sent by the Secretary
of State, and the prisoner's transport to the United States was car-
ried out aboard a United States naval vessel.3 Instead, the Court
upheld its jurisdiction over Ker and affirmed the ability of the judi-
ciary to try individuals brought to this country through kidnappings.
2. Alvarez-Machain's Misapplication of Ker. In reaching the
same conclusion, the majority in Alvarez-Machain failed to examine
the factual dissimilarity of their case to the case presented in Ker.
scribed for such trials, and [was] deprived of no rights to which he [was] lawfully enti-
tled."). For further discussion of the due process issue, see infra part II.C.
31. However, in United States v. Rauscher, decided on the same day as Ker, the
Court held that a defendant could invoke a treaty if he had been abducted under author-
ity of the state and if the offended state protests the abduction. 119 U.S. 407, 430-31
(1886).
32. The Court found that although Julian had the papers necessary to procure the
extradition of Ker pursuant to the treaty, Julian never presented them to the government
of Peru. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 442-43.
It should be noted that Ker's attorney took the somewhat novel, and perhaps mis-
guided, approach of attempting to persuade the Court that the extradition treaty between
the United States and Peru entitled Ker to asylum and "a right to be free from molesta-
tion for the crime committed in Illinois." Id. at 441. The Court declared that "Itihe right of
the government of Peru voluntarily to give a party in Ker's condition an asylum in that
country, is quite a different thing from the right in him to demand and insist upon secu-
rity in such an asylum." Id. at 442.
Perhaps if Ker's attorney had been versed in the intricacies of international law and
treaty interpretation, we might never have been confronted with the absurd decision in
Ker u. Illinois. Perhaps if a more reasoned analysis of international law and treaty inter-
pretation could have been offered to the Court, the Justices would have had to consider
the validity of such arguments. Instead, the Court merely dismissed the "asylum" argu-
ment as being an "absurdity," and thus avoided deciding any real issues of international
law. See id.
Another important point is that if Peru had objected to Ker's abduction, or had been
willing to grant him asylum, then the outcome of the case may have been very different.
For cases where the courts have been willing to find such a distinction, see United States
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980); Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d
142 (9th Cir. 1967).
For scholarly attention to this area, see Edwin M. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following
Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1934); Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law
Continued, 84 AM1. J. INT'L L. 444 (1990); Crystle, supra note 6.
33. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 438-40.
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Although Ker declared that the extradition treaty between Peru and
the United States was inapplicable, this decision was based on a
significant fact that is missing in Alvarez-Machain: the government
of the United States did not carry out Ker's abduction. 4
In Ker, the Supreme Court was swayed, in large part, by the
fact that
although Julian went to Peru with the necessary papers to procure the ex-
tradition of Ker under the [extradition] treaty, those papers remained in
his pocket and were never brought to light in Peru .... [No steps were
taken under them; and... Julian, in seizing upon the person of Ker and
carrying him out of the territory of Peru in to the United States, did not
act or profess to act under the treaty. In fact, the treaty was not called into
operation, was not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and
the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions
of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the
government of the United States.35
Using this factual determination, the Court then declared that "in
invoking the jurisdiction of this Court upon the ground that the
prisoner was denied a right conferred upon him by a treaty of the
United States, he has failed to establish the existence of any such
right."36 According to the Ker Court, the treaty was not applicable
because the United States government had not been involved in the
kidnapping. Since the treaty was binding only between the govern-
ments of the United States and Peru, it could not be invoked as
protection against actions unauthorized by the government."
The United States government's participation in Alvarez-
Machain's abduction was comprehensive and undeniable. Although
the Court's interpretation of Ker makes this fact irrelevant, if the
Court had read Ker as applying only to non-governmental abduc-
tions, thus keeping in line with modern due process jurisprudence,
the majority in Alvarez-Machain would have been forced to examine
the legality of forcible abductions as a matter of principle, instead of
purely an issue of stare decisis. At the least, such a factual
dissimilarity should have precluded the Court's perfimctory deter-
mination that Ker was directly applicable to the situation in Al-
varez-Machain.
34. Id. at 438.
35. Id. at 442-43 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 443.
37. This reading of Ker was not followed by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1957), which found no factual distinction between Ker
and the case of a defendant who, like Alvarez-Machain, was kidnapped from Mexico by
agents of the United States government. However, the Sobell court also failed to consider
the crucial distinction between authorized and unauthorized action.
564 [Vol. 42
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B. Violation of the Treaty
The Court's discussion of whether the extradition treaty had
been violated centered around United States v. Rauscher s Although
Rauscher did not involve an issue of forcible abduction, it did exam-
ine the consequences of governmental violations of extradition trea-
ties. 9
1. United States v. Rauscher. In Rauscher, the Court faced the
case of an English sailor who had been extradited to the United
States on a charge of murder." After the extradition, however,
Rauscher was charged not with murder, but rather with assault and
administering cruel and unusual punishment.4 Upon arriving in the
United States, Rauscher challenged the validity of the indictment on
the grounds that the charges were different from those upon which
he had been extradited. Justice Miller, writing for the Court, looked
to international law to find that Rauscher's objections were correct.
Since Rauscher was not charged with the crime for which he had
been extradited, the Court ordered his release.
In so doing, the Court discussed the doctrine of "specialty," un-
der which a person who is extradited may only be tried for the
charge for which he was extradited.42 This doctrine was not explicit
38. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
39. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared:
Although we have never before addressed the precise issue raised in the present
case, we have previously considered proceedings in claimed violation of an ex-
tradition treaty, and proceedings against a defendant brought before a court by
means of a forcible abduction. We addressed the former issue in United States v.
Rauscher.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2191 (1992) (citations omitted).
40. The treaty in question was signed in 1842. One of its provisions declared that
fugitives would be extradited in "certain cases" which included murder but not assault or
cruel and unusual punishment. Treaty to Define Boundaries, for the Suppression of the
Slave Trade, and for the Giving up of Criminals, Aug. 22, 1842, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 572,
576.
41. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409.
42. Under the treaty, an obligation to extradite a prisoner arose only after he was
formally charged with a crime specifically enumerated in the treaty. Further, a judge or
magistrate of the extraditing country could examine the evidence and decide if it was
strong enough to merit extradition. Id. at 420-21.
For more detailed discussion of the doctrine of specialty, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 475-78 cmt. f (1987); MICHAEL
ABBELL & BRUNO A. RIsTAu, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE § 13-2-2 (1990); M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (2d
rev. ed. 1987); John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1441 (1988); Jacqueline A. Weisman, Comment, Extraordinary Rendition: A One-way
Ticket to the U.S.... Or is it?, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 149 (1991); Kenneth E. Levitt, Note,
International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1017 (1992); Christopher J. Morvillo, Note, Individual Rights and the
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in the treaty, but the Court reasoned that it was implicit:
[It] has been attempted to be maintained [that since] there is no express
limitation in the treaty of the right of the country in which the offence was
committed to try the person for the crime alone for which he was extra-
dited .... he is, when here, liable to be tried for any offence against the
laws as though arrested here originally. This proposition of the absence of
express restriction in the treaty of the right to try him for other offenses
than that for which he was extradited, is met by the manifest scope and
object of the treaty itself.43
The Rauscher doctrine was affirmed in Cook v. United States,
which involved the interpretation of a prohibition-era treaty. 4 De-
fendants argued that their presence had been secured through a sei-
zure in violation of a treaty between Great Britain and the United
States, and that they should therefore be released.4" The Court
agreed.
In keeping with the principle of Rauscher,46 the Cook Court
held that the existence of a treaty specifically prohibiting the gov-
Doctrine of Specialty: The Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM INTL
L. J. 987 (1991).
43. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422. "It is, therefore, very clear that this treaty did not
intend to depart in this respect from the recognized public law [doctrine of specialty]" Id.
at 429.
44. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 107 (1933). During Prohibition, it was
suspected that British vessels loaded down with liquor and liquor-making ingredients
were mooring themselves just off the United States coast. There, they would be met by
smugglers who would bring the materials into the United States in violation of Prohibi-
tion laws. Cook's British-registered vessel was seized when the Coast Guard intercepted
it cruising off the coast of Massachusetts, and discovered liquor on board. Id. at 107-08.
45. Id. at 109-10.
46. The Court declared:
The Government contends that the alleged illegality of the seizure is immate-
rial. It argues that the facts proved show a violation of our law for which the
penalty of forfeiture is prescribed; that the United States may, by filing a libel
for forfeiture, ratify what otherwise would have been an illegal seizure; that the
seized vessel having been brought into the Port of Providence, the federal court
for Rhode Island acquired jurisdiction; and that, moreover, the claimant by an-
swering to the merits waived any right to object to enforcement of the penal-
ties ....
It is true that where the United States, having possession of property, files
a libel to enforce a forfeiture resulting from a violation of its laws, the fact that
the possession was acquired by a wrongful act is immaterial. The doctrine rests
primarily upon the common-law rules that any person may, at his peril, seize
property which has become forfeited to, or forfeitable by, the Government ....
The doctrine is not applicable here .... The Treaty fixes the conditions under
which a "vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the United States"....
Thereby, Great Britain agreed that adjudication may follow a rightful seizure.
Our Government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to
subject the vessel to our laws.
Id. at 120-21 (citations omitted).
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ernment's action necessitated a withdrawal of jurisdiction.4 The
Court withdrew jurisdiction not because the government lacked the
power to arrest the individuals under normal circumstances, but
rather because by signing a treaty the government had imposed a
limitation upon its own authority.48
Rauscher and Cook clearly enunciated the doctrine that the
United States government may not profit from its own violation of
international treaties, and that courts therefore may not invoke ju-
risdiction over individuals brought before them by means which
violate such treaties.49
2. Alvarez-Machain's Misapplication of Rauscher. In both
Rauscher and Cook, the Court looked beyond the specific express
provisions of the treaties involved, and emphasized the need to
maintain the spirit of the treaties as well.
In Rauscher, the Court found in the explicit procedural safe-
guards of the treaty a reason for finding an implied use of spe-
cialty.-" To decide otherwise, the Court held, would violate "the fair
purpose"5 of the treaty. Similarly, the Court in Cook declared that
47. Id. at 121-22 ("To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go
far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty.").
48. The court declared that:
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by
one upon whom the government had not conferred authority to seize at the
place where the seizure was made. The objection is that the government itself
lacked power to seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation
upon its own authority.
Id. at 121.
49. See Martin B. Sipple, The Wild, Wild Western Hemisphere: Due Process and
Treaty Limitations on the Power of United States Courts to Try Foreign Nationals Ab-
ducted Abroad by Government Agents, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1047 (1991).
50. "[The treaty not only provides that the party shall be charged with one of the
crimes mentioned,... but that evidence shall be produced [which] according to the law of
[the host] country would justify the apprehension and commitment for trial of the person
so charged." Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 421.
51. Id. at 423 (emphasis added). The Court also vehemently rejected the argument
that implied provisions could not be read into the Treaty:
No such view of solemn public treaties between the great nations of the earth
can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to give judicial construction to them.
The opposite view has been attempted to be maintained in this country
upon the ground that there is no express limitation in the treaty of the right of
the country in which the offence was committed to try the person for the crime
alone for which he was extradited, and that once being within the jurisdiction of
that country, no matter by what contrivance or fraud or by what pretense of es-
tablishing a charge provided for by the extradition treaty he may have been
brought within the jurisdiction, he is, when here, liable to be tried for any of-
fence against the laws as though arrested here originally. This proposition of the
absence of express restriction in the treaty of the right to try him for other of-
fenses than that for which he was extradited, is met by the manifest scope and
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"[t]o hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go
far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty." 2 Thus, in both
Rauscher and Cook, the Court clearly employed a broad intentional-
ist, rather than a narrow literalist, interpretation of the treaties.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Alvarez-Machain overlooks
the underlying tenets of these precedential decisions. Although Rehn-
quist recognized that the reading of the doctrine of specialty into the
Rauscher treaty was done by "implication,"53 he declared that
to infer from this Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of gain-
ing the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond estab-
lished precedent and practice. In Rauscher, the implication of a doctrine of
specialty into the terms of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty which, by its
terms, required the presentation of evidence establishing probable cause
of the crime of extradition before extradition was required, was a small
step to take. By contrast, to imply from the terms of the Treaty that it
prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of the
procedures the Treaty establishes requires a much larger inferential leap,
with only the most general of international law principles to support it.
The general principles cited by respondent simply fail to persuade us that
we should imply in the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty a term
prohibiting international abductions.54
Thus, the Court decided that because no express provision of
the treaty prohibited abduction then such an action did not violate
the treaty. Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed Rauscher and Cook as
representing instances where specific violations of treaties occurred,
and hence chose to look for such specificity in Alvarez-Machain.5
Consequently, jurisdiction over Alvarez-Machain was held to be
valid, the true import of Rauscher notwithstanding.
The dissent took issue with Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpre-
tation of international law. Justice Stevens explained Rehnquist's
misconstruction:
Although the Court's conclusion in United States v. Rauscher was sup-
ported by several judicial precedents, the holdings in these cases were not
nearly as uniform as the consensus of international opinion that con-
demns one Nation's violation of the territorial integrity of a friendly
neighbor. It is shocking to believe that a party to an extradition treaty
might believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of
object of the treaty itself.
Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
52. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22 (emphasis added).
53. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2195-97.
568 [Vol. 42
19941 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 569
citizens in the other party's territory.
56
Justice Miller in United States v. Rauscher, in order to find a
violation of the doctrine of specialty, drew upon accepted norms of
international practice and the logical consistency of requiring a
party to a treaty to abide by the "spirit" of the document. Not only
is such a search of the norms of international practice logically con-
sistent with the problem facing the Court in Rauscher, finding such
a violation in that case was far less obvious than a similar finding
would have been in Alvarez-Machain.5 Nevertheless, Rehnquist as-
serted that "only the most general of international law principles"5 9
support the proposition that forcible abductions are inherently vio-
lative of extradition treaties.
The failure of the Court to interpret the actions of the govern-
ment in light of the purpose of the treaty and the general principles
of state practice is inconsistent with precedent. The Supreme Court,
only seven years earlier, had held that it had the "responsibility to
give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the
shared expectations of the contracting parties." 0 It is difficult to rec-
oncile the decision of Alvarez-Machain with this maxim.6 1
56. Id. at 2201 & n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia,
The Charter of American States, Art. 17, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607; The United Nations Charter, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031).
57. Britain objected to the fact that Rauscher had originally been indicted on a
charge of murder and not a charge of assault or infliction of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409. Thus, Britain's objection was obviously made for
purposes of legal argumentation. However, in Alvarez-Machaim's case, the Mexican
government did not argue some intricate legal point. Instead, it forcefully maintained the
position that an extradition treaty is intended to protect the sovereignty of the signatory
powers, and that the abduction of Alvarez-Machan was in violation of the entire purpose
of treaties in general, and of extradition treaties in particular. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. at 2193-94.
58. See infra part V.
59. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
60. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (holding that, under the terms of
the Warsaw Convention, an airline was not liable for an injury to its passenger on an in-
ternational flight).
61. This is given further validation when it is taken into account that the Mexican
government had filed a number of diplomatic protests, and had indicted all those involved
in the kidnapping. The published decision of United States v. Alvarez-Machain chronicles
the following actions taken by the Mexican government following the abduction of Al-
varez-Machain:
On April 18, 1990, Mexico requested an official report on the role of the United
States in the abduction, and on May 16, 1990 and July 19, 1990, it sent diplo-
matic notes of protest from the Embassy of Mexico to the United States De-
partment of State. In the May 16th note, Mexico said that it believed that the
abduction was "carried out with the knowledge of persons working for the U.S.
government, in violation of the procedure established in the extradition treaty
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The Rehnquist opinion in Alvarez-Machain, if followed, effec-
tively eliminates treaty interpretation. If we are to look only at the
specific provision of the treaty, and are forbidden to infer terms
consistent with the spirit of it, then virtually no interpretive facul-
ties may be employed. 2
To avoid allowing the United States to violate the spirit of ex-
tradition treaties, possible courses of action for states include the
drafting of new treaties that are not capable of such ill-considered
interpretations. Such treaties could include specific provisions out-
lawing the practice of forcible abduction, or detailed preambles de-
claring the purposes of the treaty. Both are possible practical re-
sponses to the problems of Alvarez-Machain. Although such "quick-fix'
methods would have desirable effects, using them would amount to
implicit endorsement of the literalist decision of Alvarez-Machain.
C. Due Process
Even in the absence of a finding that the treaty was violated,
the prosecution of Alvarez-Machain should have been barred on due
process grounds. Although Ker and some later cases have held that
forcible abduction for prosecution does not violate due process, this
holding is inconsistent with the modem meaning of the Due Process
Clause as it has been interpreted in related contexts. However, the
Court did not even address the possibility that Ker's time had
passed, and that it should be overruled.
1. Frisbie v. Collins. The holding of Ker, that United States
courts are not divested of jurisdiction over a defendant "for mere ir-
regularities in the manner in which he may be brought into the
in force between the two countries," and in the July 19th note, it requested the
provisional arrest and extradition of the law enforcement agents allegedly in-
volved in the abduction.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
62. Rehnquist does seem willing to allow implied provisions to be found, but only if
it can be shown that the practice of states is to specifically find such a provision in all
treaties of the same nature. Id. at 2195-96.
Another point of significant interest is the disingenuous nature of Rehnquist's opin-
ion. He repeatedly claims that it is beyond the power of the Court to find that the treaty
prohibits all means of seizure of individuals that are not expressly provided for in the
text, saying at one point that "to infer from this Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all
means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond estab-
lished precedent and practice." Id. at 2196 (emphasis added). Rehnquist's use of the
phrase "all means" is indicative of the way he presents his argument. He fails to address
the point that the case at issue does not involve the ability of the United States to "gain]
the presence of an individual;" rather, it merely declares that to gain the presence of that
individual through a forcible abduction is in violation of the treaty. This is an important
distinction which Rehnquist has either overlooked or purposely ignored.
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custody of the law,"63 was reaffirmed and expanded sixty-six years
later in the case of Frisbie v. Collins.' In Frisbie, the defendant had
been tried and convicted of murder by the courts of Michigan. How-
ever, in a federal habeas corpus petition, he insisted that the man-
ner in which he had been brought before the Michigan courts was in
violation of his constitutional right to due process. He argued that
his conviction should be overturned, and that he should be released. 5
Collins, while residing in Chicago, had been accosted by sev-
eral members of the Michigan police. The officers handcuffed and
beat him before transporting him back to Michigan to stand trial for
murder.6 The Supreme Court held that "the power of a court to try a
person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible ab-
duction."'67
Thus, the original holding of Ker v. Illinois was expanded to
include purely domestic incidents of governmental kidnapping. Even
though Frisbie is a domestic case, the two cases are almost always
referred together as comprising the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. This doc-
trine has been "a staple of U.S. jurisprudence for over 100 years and
has emerged relatively unscathed from a series of attacks,"68 even
though it has met with considerable criticism and several attempts
to limit its applicability.69
2. United States v. Toscanino. Attempts to limit the scope of
Ker-Frisbie have been largely unsuccessful. However, United States
v. Toscanino70 represents the most powerful exception to the univer-
sal application of Ker-Frisbie.
63. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886).
64. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
65. Id. at 519-20. Collins also argued that the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1202 (1988), enacted after the Ker decision, prohibited a kidnapping similar to the one
at issue in Ker. The Court disagreed. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. at 522-23.
66. Id. at 520-25.
67. Id. at 522 (citation omitted). Strangely, the Court did not view this as a case in-
volving the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Jonathan Gentin argued that the de-
cision in this case was intended to limit the scope of the "exclusionary rule" enunciated in
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942). See Gentin, supra note 6, at 1234-35.
68. Matorin, supra note 6, at 910.
69. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 432 rep. note 2, § 433 cmt. b (1987); Richard Downing, The Domestic and Inter-
national Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals From Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J.
INTL L. 573 (1990); Gentin, supra note 6; Levitt, supra note 42; Darin A. Bifani, Com-
ment, The Tension Between Policy Objectives and Individual Rights: Extradition, Abduc-
tion, and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 627 (1993). But see Ma-
torin, supra note 6; William M. Smith, Camarena Case: A Place U.S. Can Draw the Line,
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 27, 1992, at A13; Weisman, supra note 42.
70. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Toscanino, an Italian citizen, had been indicted for conspiracy
to import narcotics into the United States. He alleged that the
United States government, without making any attempt to gain
control of him through legal or political channels, had arranged to
have him kidnapped from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay. He
claimed to have been lured from his home by United States govern-
ment agents, then knocked unconscious by seven assailants and
thrown into the back of a car. From there, he said, he was trans-
ported to Brasilia, where he was subjected to grotesque treatment
and incessant torture. 1
The Toscanino court noted that "[flor years [Ker and Frisbie]
have been the mainstay of a doctrine to the effect that the govern-
ment's power to prosecute a defendant is not impaired by the ille-
gality of the method by which it acquires control over him."72 How-
ever, it declared that, if Toscanino had in fact been treated as he al-
leged, "the government should as a matter of fundamental fairness
be obligated to return him to his status quo ante."7 3 The court rea-
soned that the Ker-Frisbie concept of due process is contradicted by
that expressed in more recent cases, which hold that due process
"protects the accused against pretrial illegality by denying to the
government the fruits of its exploitation of any deliberate and un-
necessary unlawfulness on its part."74 Where there is such a contra-
diction, the court held, "the Ker-Frisbie version [of due process] must
yield."75
71. Id. at 267-70. Toscanino alleged that his torment lasted approximately
seventeen days, during which he was fed intravenously in amounts intended to just
barely keep him alive. He further claimed that during interrogations
his fingers were pinched with metal pliers; [ailcohol was flushed into his eyes
and nose and other fluids... were forced up his anal passage .... [Algents of
the United States government attached electrodes to [his] earlobes, toes, and
genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering
him unconscious for indeterminate periods of time ....
Id. at 270.
72. Id. at 275.
73. Id.; see also Gentin, supra note 6, at 1237-38. Gentin also argues that the Second
Circuit created this exception because of the expanded role of the Fourth Amendment as
it applied to the states, and because of "the Supreme Court's expansion of the concept of
due process." Id. at 1237 (quoting United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275). Although
this is certainly the theoretical basis upon which the court relied, the moral issue seems
equally important.
74. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. The court cites Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) (setting aside conviction on grounds that police violated suspect's due
process rights when they pumped his stomach to obtain swallowed evidence); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that illegally obtained evidence must be excluded in
state court proceedings); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that
confession obtained subsequent to an illegal arrest was "tainted" and therefore inadmissable).
75. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
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Although the principles underlying the decision in Toscanino go
far in returning the United States' forcible abduction jurisprudence
to a level of moral acceptability, the case has ultimately had the un-
fortunate effect of limiting any other attempts to impose moral re-
quirements into this area of the law. It is precisely the fact that Tos-
canino's abduction and subsequent torture were so shocking that
has hampered the case's applicability as a bar to Ker-Frisbie. Be-
cause the facts were so outrageous, courts have been particularly
reluctant to declare any other case to be shocking enough to rise to
its level.
Subsequent cases have limited Toscanino by declaring that
mere forcible kidnapping, without evidence of torture or other such
barbarous conduct, does not rise to the level of "shocking the con-
science."76 In the end, Toscanino has failed to overturn the holdings
of Ker-Frisbie, and decisions such as Alvarez-Machain continue to
hold that forcible abductions do not divest the courts of jurisdiction.
3. Alvarez-Machain and Due Process. The Court in Alvarez-
Machain used the following analysis:
[Olur first inquiry must be whether the abduction of the respondent from
Mexico violated the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico. If we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit respondent's ab-
duction, the rule in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how
respondent came before it.
77
Although the Court mentions that its "first inquiry" concerns the
violation of the extradition treaty, the logic of the decision proves
otherwise. In fact, the Court made a preliminary, and unspoken,
determination that "the rule in Ker" was fully applicable to Alvarez-
Machain.7' By accepting the applicability of this "rule," the Court's
"first inquiry" became, in effect, its only inquiry. The Supreme Court
not only passed up an opportunity to overrule Ker-Frisbie, but also
gave it a strong and lasting endorsement.
Instead, the Court should have recognized those cases as what
76. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that mere governmental kidnapping, without allegations of torture, was not
shocking to the conscience), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v.
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that the allegations of
mistreatment did not "constitute acts of such barbarism as to warrant dismissal of the
indictment"), affd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.
1991), reu'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
77. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
78. Even Justice Stevens, dissenting, felt that Ker-Frisbie was still a viable tool for
deciding cases. He argued only that the majority misinterpreted the treaty. Id. at 2198-
206. As for Ker, Stevens merely distinguished the facts of Alvarez-Machain from it, id. at
2197, 2203, but made no mention of Ker's illegitimacy.
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they are, "an archaic remainder of an era before the constitutional
regulation of criminal law enforcement." 9 Rather than simply as-
sume their validity, and thereby implicitly let Toscanino stand as a
narrowly drawn "exception" to their rule,80 the Court should have
embraced the reasoning of Toscanino, and held that under the mod-
em view of due process, the government may not secure a defendant
for prosecution through illegal kidnapping, whether the particular
tactics used are "cruel, inhuman and outrageous," 81 or merely
"deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable."82 Such a decision would
have done much to enhance the moral stature of the United States.
Instead, we are left with a powerful endorsement of Ker-Frisbie, and
an expansion of its application.
Even if an explicit overruling of Ker-Frisbie was unlikely, 3 the
facts of Alvarez-Machain provided the Court with an opportunity to
greatly limit the applicability of Ker-Frisbie. At the least, the Court
could easily have held that the Ker-Frisbie rule is inapplicable in
cases of governmental abduction, or in cases where the offended
state protests the abduction. All this would have been unnecessary,
however, had the Court not refused to apply the most important,
and theoretically most applicable, avenue of relief-customary in-
ternational law.
Ill. THE RELEVANCE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Court only briefly addressed the issue of whether the ab-
duction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain was in violation of international law,
and if so, whether that violation required his repatriation to Mexico.
Although the Court was willing to concede that "[r]espondent and
his amici may be correct that respondent's abduction was 'shocking,'
and that it may be in violation of general international law princi-
79. Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here?: Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-
Machain, 45 STAN. L. REv. 939, 964 (1993).
80. The district court held that the circumstances of the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain "do not constitute acts of such barbarism as to warrant dismissal of the indict-
ment" under the terms of the 'exception" delineated in Toscanino and its progeny. United
States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing, inter alia, United
States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)), affd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d
1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The Supreme Court, however, did not
discuss even the existence of an exception to Ker-Frisbie, let alone hold that it is large
enough to swallow the rule.
81. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975).
82. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
83. See Bush, supra note 79, at 964-65 (discussing the unlikelihood of Ker being
overruled).
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ples," 4 it said that it was powerless to rectify such violations, stating
simply that "the decision of whether respondent should be returned
to Mexico ... is a matter for the executive branch."85
In fact, extraterritorial forcible abductions violate the most ba-
sic definitions and perceptions of state sovereignty and individual
rights under customary international law. However, as the decision
in Alvarez-Machain demonstrates, the judiciary has historically
been unwilling to apply this law against the executive. Such unwill-
ingness, this Article will argue, directly conflicts with the theoretical
and historical underpinnings upon which the judiciary was created,
and frustrates broader United States interests.
A. Forcible Abductions as Violations of Customary International
Law
International law concerns the "conduct of nation-states and
their relations with other states, and to some extent also with their
relations with individuals, business organizations, and other legal
entities.""6 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice enumerates the sources of international law:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c)... general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d)... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determi-
nation of rules of law.
8 7
84. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992) (citation
omitted).
85. Id.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101
(1990). But see Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665, 669 (1986) (arguing that international law deals with "the body of
rules governing the relations of nation states").
87. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1977 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No.3, at 77.
The Restatement lists the sources of international law as follows:
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the in-
ternational community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal
systems of the world.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1989).
The Restatement, unlike the Statute, lists customary international law before treaty law.
This is interesting to note because of the continuing debate in the United States over the
hierarchical status of different forms of international law. See generally Michael Ake-
hurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273
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Treaty law is the most easily ascertained, and is, in this coun-
try, the most readily accepted form of international law.8 This is so
for two reasons. First, treaties are written agreements between con-
senting state parties that create shared and binding obligations;89 as
such they fall within traditional positivistic notions of legitimate
forms of law. Second, the place of treaties in the domestic system is
enumerated in the Constitution, giving the judiciary a clear founda-
tion for making legal determinations.
Customary international law consists of duties and privileges of
states that can be discerned from an understanding of normative
state practice, which is followed out of a sense of mutual obligation."
State practice does not need to be uniform; however, it is generally
understood that it must be "widespread" and "should reflect wide ac-
ceptance."9
Finally, "general principles" of international law "have never
expressly [been] referred to" by the International Court of Justice, 2
and do not, in themselves, create obligations between states. There-
fore, "their traditional role in international law is consequently
small."3
Treaty and customary law both create obligations on the part of
states in their international relations, whereas general principles of
law do not create such obligations. Of these three areas of interna-
tional law, customary law provides the greatest possibilities for uni-
versal application. Customary law, unlike treaty law, is binding
upon nations regardless of whether they have expressly accepted its
application. 4 However, customary international law is not binding
on a state that expressly rejects the principle during its formation.6
The decision in Alvarez-Machain demonstrates the judiciary's
lack of understanding of international law. Particularly, Justice Re-
hnquist's statement that forcible abductions may be "in violation of
general international law principles" belies the Court's unfamiliarity
(1974-75).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. III (making treaties the supreme law of the land).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(3) (1989) ("International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and
may lead to the creation of customary international law when such agreements are in-
tended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.").
90. "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them, from a sense of legal obligation." Id.
91. Id. at §102 cmt. b.
92. Howard S. Schrader, Comment, Custom and General Principles as Sources of
International Law in American Federal Courts, 82 COLUMI. L. REV. 751, 756 (1982).
93. Id.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102
cmt. b (1989).
95. Id. § 102 cmt. d.
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with customary international law." An examination of the applica-
ble standards of customary law demonstrates, without dispute, that
forcible abductions violate far more than "principles;" they violate
customary international law.9
7
1. Violation of State Sovereignty. The accepted principle that
"law enforcement officers cannot arrest [fugitives] in another state
... [without] that state's consent"98 clearly indicates the current
state of customary international law towards forcible abductions.
This principle was given its most explicit endorsement in the United
Nations Security Council's unanimous condemnation of the abduc-
tion of Adolf Eichmann by Israel. 9
Other international bases which could be invoked to nullify
forcible abductions include the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the Organization of American States. Both of these
documents require respect for territorial boundaries by all signatory
nations. Thus, an abduction carried out without the consent of the
host country would violate the customary norms of territorial re-
spect contained in these documents.' 0
The Second Circuit admitted as much when it noted in dicta
that if a nation objected to the abduction of an individual within its
territory, then the territorial provisions of the U.N. Charter and
O.A.S. Charter could be invoked.'" Mexico, for its part, immediately
objected to Alvarez-Machain's abduction, filed a number of diplo-
matic protests, and indicted all those involved in the kidnapping.0 2
96. Justice Rehnquist uses the term "general principles" repeatedly in his opinion.
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992).
97. The principles enunciated in the sections to follow have all risen to the level of
customary international law, and the United States has not dissented from the proscrip-
tions contained in these documents.
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432(2) cmt. b (1987).
99. See Question Relating to the Case of Adolf Eichmann, S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR,
15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. s/4349 (1960). Israel kidnapped Eichmann from his
home in Argentina. Even given the nature of Eichmann's crimes, the Security Council
still voted 8-0 in favor of condemning Israel's action. The Security Council declared that
abductions, "if repeated, [may] endanger international peace and security," and requested
that Israel make reparations to Argentina. Id.
100. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."); O.A.S. CHARTER art. 15 ("No State... has the right to inter-
vene, directly or indirectly... in the internal or external affairs of any other State."); id.
at art. 17 ("The territory of a State is inviolable .... ").
101. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975); see also Downing, supra note 69, at 589 n.93.
102. The Mexican government, in a diplomatic note issued May 16, 1990, declared:
As a consequence of [the kidnapping], which violate[s] both the mexican
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However, Justice Rehnquist chose, even in the face of this Mexican
response, to ignore the possible applicability of the Charters, and
their principles of territorial and sovereign respect.
International reaction to the decision was equally swift and
critical. The governments of Canada, Colombia, Uruguay, Jamaica,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay joined in condemn-
ing the abduction as violative of international law.113 These criti-
cisms resulted in a declaration by the Inter-American Juridicial
Committee of the Organization of American States, which stated
that the Court in Alvarez-Machain "ignores the fundamental prin-
ciple of international law, namely, respect for the territorial sover-
eignty of states."'
Further, the United Nations amended the Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics to include a declaration that all state par-
ties "shall not undertake in the territory of another party the exer-
cise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclu-
sively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic
law."10 5
[sic] Constitutional Law, as well as International Law, the corresponding Mexi-
can authorities have already initiated a criminal action proceedings [sic] in ac-
cordance with mexican [sic] law, against the intellectual and material perpetu-
ators [sic] of the illegal kidnapping and transfer to the United States of Dr.
Humberto Alvarez Machain, because it is deemed that in such a case, the
crimes of kidnapping, false imprisonment and criminal association were com-
mitted....
The Embassy of Mexico, upon specific instructions from its Government, re-
quests ... that Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain be returned back to Mexico ....
Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in support of Granting Review at
5a-6a, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).
103. The Canadian minister of external affairs told the Canadian Parliament that
any attempt by the United States to kidnap a Canadian would be regarded as a criminal
act. David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance: U.S. Feels Heat for Ruling that Permits
Government Idnapping, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1992, at 50. The Colombian government issued a
statement declaring that the Alvarez-Machain decision "threatens the legal stability of
[all] public treaties." Id. A resolution adopted by the lower house of the Parliament of
Uruguay asserted that Alvarez-Machain evinces "a lack of understanding of the most
elemental norms of international law, and in particular an absolute perversion of the
function of extradition treaties." Id. Jamaica's Minister of Security denounced the deci-
sion as "an atrocity that would disturb the world order." Id. The governments of Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay, in a Joint Statement to the Organization of
American States, requested a review of the Alvarez-Machain decision. Id.
104. Id. The Committee also declared that if the principles of Alvarez-Machain were
to gain international acceptance "the International Juridicial Order would be irreversibly
shattered." Id. The Committee concluded by stating the United States was obligated, as a
matter of international law, to return Alvarez-Machain to Mexico. Id.
105. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, adopted by consensus Dec. 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF..82/15 and rev. 1, re-
printed in 28 I.L.M. 493, 500 (1989). The additional language quoted above was created in
direct response to United States abductions on Nov. 11, 1990.
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Beginning, at least, in 1945, the United States has helped to
create these norms of customary international law, and has prom-
ised to uphold them. In fact, the United States has been the major
player in creating a system of international relations based upon
territorial respect. The principle of "territorial sovereignty" is clearly
a norm of customary international law. The United States has
agreed to uphold this principle, upon which much of the interna-
tional order is founded. Unsanctioned military or police actions in
the territory of another state clearly violates these international ob-
ligations. Forcible abductions violate international law, which the
United States has sworn to obey, and such obligations should have
been upheld by the courts.
2. Violations of Individual Rights. n addition to violating state
sovereignty, forcible abductions also violate individual rights as de-
fined under international law."°6 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides individuals with basic
protections from arbitrary arrest and unreasonable delay before
trial.107 It also provides that "everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person[, and that n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as
are established by law."0 8 Finally, the ICCPR prohibits "cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment,"0 9 and declares that
"all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity
and.., respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.""0 The
Human Rights Committee, which interprets and explains the IC-
CPR, has declared that forcible abductions "constitute arbitrary ar-
rest and detention" outside of the "procedures established by law.""'
Arbitrary arrest and detention are also prohibited by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention
on Human Rights. The American Convention on Human Rights
states: "[ejvery person has the right to have his physical, mental,
and moral integrity respected."" 2 This language is echoed in the
106. Some may argue that the examples of international law discussed here and
above are all non-self-executing documents, and that as such they do not carry domestic
implications. However, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing is
relevant only as to treaties. The documents discussed here have been put forward to show
examples of customary international law, which is automatically self-executing against all
states.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
108. Id. at art. 9(1).
109. Id. at art. 7.
110. Id. at art. 10(1).
111. Id.
112. O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (1970).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[n1o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."113
Forcible abductions simply cannot be reconciled with the basic
rights detailed in the ICCPR and other treaties, since "[in any case
of abduction, there is a violation of personal liberty, [and] of the
right to be detained under legal authority .... Personal integrity is
[also] usually violated because of the force typically required to sub-
due and transport an abductee.""4 Once again, forcible abductions
do not violate "principles," they violate basic international laws.
B. Customary International Law in the United States
1. The Case of The Paquete Habana. The dispute over the do-
mestic applicability of customary international law in the United
States derives in large part from the 1900 case of The Paquete
Habana, and especially from the following celebrated passage from
that case:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling ex-
ecutive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the cus-
toms and usages of civilized nations. . ..'15
On the one hand, this pronouncement affirmed the incorpora-
tion of international law into the decision-making process of the
United States judiciary. At the same time, however, some have in-
terpreted it to mean that international law, and specifically custom-
ary international law, can be superseded by either federal statutory
provisions or executive acts. In effect, the decision handed down in
The Paquete Habana has had the unfortunate consequence of evis-
cerating customary international law in the United States. Even
though Justice Gray deserves the credit for confirming the domestic
applicability of customary international law, his reservations about
its implementation have effectively precluded its use except in the
rarest of cases.
The Paquete Habana arose from the Spanish-American War.
The facts of the case revolve around the seizure of two Cuban fishing
vessels by the United States Navy, pursuant to a naval blockade
around Cuba. By proclamation of the President, the blockade was to
be maintained "in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and
113. G.A. Res. 217A(III), 3 U.N. GAOR (Resolutions, part I) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
114. Crystle, supra note 6, at 394.
115. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).
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the law of nations applicable to such cases."" 6 Because of this proc-
lamation, the Supreme Court held that the blockade was intended to
be conducted "in accordance with the principles of international law
sanctioned by the recent practice of nations.""7 Justice Gray there-
fore spent a considerable amount of his decision discussing the his-
torical prohibitions against the capture of fishing vessels during
wartime."' From this historical pattern, he came to the conclusion
that the exclusion of fishing vessels from prize captures was a gen-
eral norm of customary international law, and he therefore ordered
the boats returned to their owners.
In essence, then, The Paquete Habana Court did not apply
customary international law directly, but only through the medium
of the presidential proclamation. It is not clear whether Justice Gray
would have applied international law were it not for the fact that the
presidential proclamation declared that it should be applied, al-
though his dictum suggests that he would. On the other hand, if the
President had declared that fishing vessels were legitimate targets
for capture, then under the same dictum the Court would be pre-
cluded from introducing international law on behalf of the injured
party. At any rate, the case has come to be interpreted by the execu-
tive branch as a declaration that it may violate international law at
any time merely by expressly doing so, and that the Supreme Court
is helpless to intervene."'
This interpretation has been encouraged by numerous exam-
ples of judicial refusal to decide issues of customary international
law, notably including the cases of National City Bank of New York
v. Republic of China,"0 Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United
States,"' and Eisner v. United States. 22 In all of these cases, the
116. Proclamation No. 6, 30 Stat. 1769 (1898), quoted in The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. at 712.
117. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712.
118. Justice Gray examined, among other things, agreements made between Henry
IV of England and the King of France in 1403, id. at 687, Louis XVI's directive to his navy
that fishing vessels should be exempted from capture, id. at 689-90, and Napoleon's criti-
cism of the English for violating the norms of international conduct by capturing fishing
vessels attempting to cross the English blockade, id. at 692-93.
119. See infra part III.B.2.
120. 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (refusing to grant the Taiwan government sovereign im-
munity in a case involving defaulted treasury notes; deciding the case instead upon equity
considerations).
121. 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. C1.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955). During the Allied
occupation of Japan, General MacArthur had ordered the Japanese government to
effectuate some repairs. In making its decision the court refused to consider whether,
under customary international law, an occupying force may make such orders to the
conquered nation. Instead, the court felt that MacArthur's order was for the benefit of the
Japanese, and thus to make the United States pay for the repairs would constitute unjust
enrichment.
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courts have refused to consider customary international law, choos-
ing to rely instead upon issues of policy and equity. Thus, it is ar-
gued, the judiciary allowed the executive branch, and the military
under its authority, to violate international law without a review of
its actions.
2. The Paquete Habana's Unfortunate Legacy. The end result of
this interpretation can be seen in recent pronouncements by high
ranking officials of the Department of Justice and the State De-
partment, which have proclaimed the authority of the executive
branch to violate customary international law without fear of judi-
cial review. In particular, they have claimed that the judiciary is
barred from applying customary international law to cases of gov-
ernmentally sponsored kidnappings abroad.
In 1989, William Barr, then Assistant Attorney General of the
United States, testified before the House Judiciary Committee that
executive branch authorization of forcible abductions of foreign na-
tionals would violate international law.123 Nevertheless, Barr main-
tained that "[ulnder our constitutional system, the executive and
legislative branches, acting under the scope of their respective
authority, may take or direct actions which depart from customary
international law."'2
This view contradicts a 1980 Carter administration opinion,
which declared that the government only had the power to conduct
abductions of fugitives "when the asylum state acquiesces to the
proposed operation."12 In effect, the Justice Department, under the
Bush administration, completely reversed the United States' posi-
tion on the constitutionality of executive violations of international
law.1G
122. 117 F. Supp. 197, 199 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (refusing to examine international law
questions about the powers of occupying forces to act in a conquered territory; justifying
the conversion of plaintiffs bank account by the American commander in Berlin as an ac-
tion that was "reasonably calculated to accomplish a beneficial purpose").
123. See Extraterritorial Enforcement Activities, supra note 4. Barr's testimony be-
fore the Senate Subcommittee was intended to summarize the views expressed in a confi-
dential Justice Department memorandum. At the hearing, Barr declared that he was
"happy to share with the Committee [the Justice Department's] legal reasoning and con-
clusions," but that "the content of the 1989 Opinion... must remain confidential." Id. at
11.
For a more complete analysis of the circumstances surrounding Barr's statement be-
fore the Senate Subcommittee see Harold Honju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal
Counsel From Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 513, 518-19 (1993); Monroe Leigh, Is the Presi-
dent Above Customary International Law?, 86 AMI. J. INT'L L. 757 (1992).
124. Extraterritorial Enforcement Activities, supra note 4, at 4.
125. Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 543, 544 (1980).
126. See Extraterritorial Enforcement Activities, supra note 4, at 6; see also Brief for
[Vol. 42582
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Abraham Sofaer, then Legal Advisor for the Department of
State, further supported this position by declaring that the United
States must be allowed to conduct forcible abductions because "our
national defense requires that we claim the right to act within the
territory of other States in appropriate circumstances." 127 Although
Sofaer conceded "[iut would be wrong... to extrapolate... that
[forcible] seizures [abroad] are perfectly lawful,"12 he supported the
position of the Barr opinion by declaring that "the Due Process
clause of the Constitution does not automatically preclude U.S.
courts from trying persons forcibly seized abroad by U.S. authori-
ties.' 2 9
Such an argument does not suppose that violations of interna-
tional law, in the form of forcible abductions, will not be attacked on
the international stage. Instead, it proposes that the domestic judi-
ciary has declared itself, in The Paquete Habana and elsewhere, to
be powerless to review or rectify such violations.
Barr, and the Justice and State Departments, were of the view
that The Paquete Habana decision stands for the proposition that
international law should be applied in United States courts only
"where there is no treaty and no controlling executive... act."130
Thus, where the executive branch takes "controlling" action, or, un-
der their interpretation, almost any action,' 3 ' customary interna-
tional law should not be applied by United States courts to nullify
such action.
To support this view, Barr cited Brown v. United States,3 2 The
Respondent at 16 & n.11, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 1189 (1992) (No.
91-712). Interestingly, this Brief declares that: "In 1976, Congress specifically prohibited
the DEA from taking part in arrests of foreign nationals in the sovereign territory of
other governments. This action was a specific response to concerns over DEA activities
abroad." Id. (citations omitted).
127. Abraham Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A Solf Lecture in International
Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 92 (1989).
128. Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Gov-
ernmental Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing on S. 1337, S. 1429, and S. 1508 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1985).
129. Id.
130. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
131. For instance, in the Alvarez-Machain case, it is not argued that the President
authorized the abduction through any "controlling act." In fact, the evidence is clear that
no person outside of the Drug Enforcement Agency authorized, or was even aware of, the
plan to kidnap Alvarez-Machan. In what way this satisfies the Justice and State De-
partment's definition of "controlling executive action" is entirely unclear.
132. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). Brown involved the improper actions of John
Delano, a shipowner who had contracted to carry timber and other goods to British mer-
chants in Plymouth, England, during the War of 1812. When he attempted to sail for
Plymouth, he was blocked by the United States embargo and sent back to New Bedford,
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Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,'13 Tag v. Rogers,134 and The Over
the Top. 135 However, commentators on this subject have convincingly
shown that these cases do not support the Justice Department's
opinion as to the power of the executive branch to violate interna-
tional law. In particular, Richard Pregent has noted that
[elvery case cited in [Barrs] statement before Congress and all other re-
corded cases dealing with this issue, refer to the displacement of interna-
Massachusetts.
At New Bedford, he sold the goods to Armitz Brown, an American. Five months after
selling these goods, Delano then seized the goods in the name of the United States, be-
cause, he claimed, the goods belonged to British subjects and therefore were subject to
seizure during time of war. Delano argued that the property had originally been sold to
British citizens, and that after war between the United States and England had been de-
clared, all property owned by British citizens was forfeited under customary international
law, and it did not matter that the property had subsequently been sold to an American.
Chief Justice Marshall felt that customary international law would not allow for the
seizure and ruled against Delano. However, Marshall noted in dicta that customary in-
ternational law was only "a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will... and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be dis-
regarded." Id. at 128.
133. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The Schooner decision concluded that, under
customary international law, a French warship could not be subject to United States ju-
dicial action while in American territorial waters. However, the Court also stated, in
dicta, that a sovereign has the right to suspend that law within its territory. As Chief
Justice Marshall noted:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any re-
striction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a dimi-
nution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of
that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such re-
striction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within
its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They
can flow from no other legitimate source.
Id. at 136.
134. 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Tag involved a constitutional attack on the legal-
ity of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) Tag argued that the statute was in violation of the 1923 Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Right between the United States and Germany, 44
Stat. 2132, amended by 49 Stat. 3258 (1935).
The court, doing little more than reaffirming the holding in the Chinese Exclusion
Case, held that Congress has the right to pass later statutes that invalidate preexisting
treaties. For a discussion of the Chinese Exclusion Case, see infra notes 144-49 and ac-
companying text.
135. 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925). The Over the Top involved the sale of alcohol in in-
ternational waters during the time of Prohibition. The court held for defendants because
their actions had taken place in international waters, and Congress had not specifically
declared that the reach of Prohibition statutes was intended to extend beyond the three
mile limit of territorial waters. However, the court also declared that Congress could so
extend the reach of the statute in the future, and thus effectively overrule the customary
international law limit of three miles. Id. at 843.
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tional law within the territory controlled by the sovereign. There exists no
case law that sets forth the authority of either Congress or the President
to displace international law outside the territory of the United States.1 3 6
Pregent is not entirely satisfied with the idea that Congress or the
President has absolute authority to displace international law even
within the domestic system:
[I]nternational law can be displaced domestically. Many issues remained
to be settled, however. Left in doubt were the matters of the kind of inter-
national law that could be displaced, the governmental entities that could
displace this law, and how this displacement might be accomplished.
1 3 1
Thus, there has never been clear precedential support for a
general power of the executive to displace customary international
law. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-
Machain may become the precedent that, until now, the executive
has lacked. Accordingly, William Barr has praised the decision, de-
claring that it "vindicates the position we have taken from the out-
set,"1 38 namely that, under The Paquete Habana, executive power to
violate international law remains unchecked by the judiciary.
IV. THE COURTS' DEFERENTIAL STANCE
An explanation for the continued vitality of this interpretation
of The Paquete Habana and its progeny can be found in the tradi-
tional role that courts have played in reviewing the executive's for-
eign policy decisions. Generally speaking, they have been unwilling
to interfere with them in any way. This unwillingness has mani-
fested itself in two ways. First, in discussing such controversial
areas as the power of the federal government to conduct foreign af-
fairs, or of the President to act in the interests of national security,
the courts have granted broad discretionary powers that are not
constitutionally mandated. Second, in those rare instances where
the courts have not found "implicit" constitutional grants to uphold
136. Richard Pregent, Presidential Authority to Displace Customary International
Law, 129 MIL. L. REV. 77, 83-84 (1990).
137. Id. at 80. For further criticism, see Leigh, supra note 123; see also Michael R.
Pontoni, Authority of the United States to Extraterritorially Apprehend and Lawfully
Prosecute International Drug Traffickers and Other Fugitives, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215
(1990/1991); Jordan J. Paust, The President is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 377 (1987); Brigette Belton Homrig, Comment, Abduction as an Alternative to
Extradition-A Dangerous Method to Obtain Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671 (1993). But see Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th
Cir.) (holding that "public international law is controlling only 'where there is no treaty
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision'"), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
889 (1986).
138. David G. Savage, U.S. Abductions Abroad Upheld, L.A. TIES, June 16, 1992,
at Al.
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actions taken by the executive branch, they have sidestepped the is-
sue through liberal application of the political questions doctrine.
A. Broad Extra-Constitutional Powers
1. The Federal Government Generally. The power of the federal
government to conduct foreign affairs is broad and exclusive. The
ability of individuals or states to act on the international scene is
restricted by the federal government, and in many cases is explicitly
prohibited. The reason for this is clear: If foreign policy were allowed
to be conducted by a myriad of actors, the disunity and conflict that
would ensue could result in significant international discord. There
is a clear logical need for allowing only one "person" to engage in
American foreign affairs. 139
Although the logic of this argument seems clear, and has been
repeatedly upheld, it is one that has no real constitutional basis.10
Instead, it has traditionally been held that the inherent and exclu-
sive power of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs is
extra-constitutional.'"' As Professor Henkin notes:
From the beginning, it was clear, this "more perfect union" was one sov-
ereign nation and the federal government has maintained the relations of
that nation with other sovereign nations. But the Constitution does not
say so expressly or even by indisputable implication. Indeed, where for-
eign relations are concerned the Constitution seems a strange, laconic
document.
142
Many important Supreme Court cases have helped to define the
powers of the Federal government and the executive branch in for-
eign affairs. However, an examination of these cases shows that
their decisions have no real constitutional support. For example,
federal power in foreign affairs was articulated forcefully in The Le-
gal Tender Cases:'43
The United States is not only a government, but is a national government,
and the only government in this country that has the character of na-
tionality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the
country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other nations;
139. See id; see also JEAN M. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND AIERICAN FOREIGN
PoLIcY 1-2 (1989).
140. LOuIs HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1972) ("The pow-
ers of the United States to conduct relations with other nations do not derive from the
Constitution!").
141. See, e.g., id. at 15-18; SMITH, supra note 139, at 1-2.
142. HENKIN, supra note 140, at 15-16.
143. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
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all of which are forbidden to the State governments.44
The rationale behind this holding also formed the basis for the Su-
preme Court's decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case).45 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that Congress enjoyed the unlimited power to exclude Chinese ali-
ens from the United States.
The case involved the constitutionality of the first national
immigration act' 46 and, in particular, a series of Chinese exclusion
acts that were promulgated from 1882 to 1892.147 The Court found
the Acts to be within the power of Congress, stating that "the United
States, in their relation to foreign countries ... are one nation, in-
vested with the powers which belong to independent nations, the ex-
ercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute
independence and security throughout its entire territory."
48
The basis for such a conclusion was found not in the Constitu-
tion but in nineteenth century conceptions of sovereignty and state-
hood. 49 The basic concept that the federal government has exclusive
control over foreign affairs and national security is implied in the
notion that the United States is a sovereign nation. The federal gov-
ernment, as representative of the nation as a whole, is therefore
144. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
145. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
146. See An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration, ch. 141, 18
Stat. 477 (1875) (excluding prostitutes and all persons convicted of felonies from admis-
sion into the United States).
147. See An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to the Chinese, ch.
126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Execute Certain
Treaty Stipulations Relating to the Chinese," ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (1884); An Act to Sup-
plement an Act Entitled "An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to the
Chinese," ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888); An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons
into the United States, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892), repealed by Act of Oct. 20, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-461, 88 Stat. 1387.
These Acts were intended to supplement an earlier Act of Congress that had at-
tempted to ensure that immigration from China and other "Oriental" countries was vol-
untary on the part of those immigrating. See An Act to Prohibit the "Coolie Trade" by
American Citizens in American Vessels, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862), repealed by Act of Oct.
20, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-461, 88 Stat. 1387.
It has been suggested that these Acts were passed due to rising "unemployment,
economic depression, and growing 'nativism', racism, and xenophobia .... " Louis Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 855 (1987); see also THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A.
MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 1-18 (2d ed. 1991).
148. Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. at 604.
149. Henkin, supra note 147, at 857-58 ("Indeed, although basing this power (to
control immigration] in sovereignty was novel and in principle might have frightened
many of the original framers as well as later guardians of states' rights, the conclusion
that Congress had authority to regulate immigration was in fact accepted and has not
been challenged.") (footnotes omitted).
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vested with the powers of that sovereign. This concept was to find its
greatest and most famous support in Justice Sutherland's opinion in
the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.10
Curtiss-Wright involved a Joint Resolution of Congress that
empowered the President to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions
to Bolivia and Paraguay.151 President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a
proclamation forbidding the sale of war materials to either country.
Those convicted of violating the proclamation could be punished by
fine or imprisonment, or both.
The Curtiss-Wright Corporation was charged with having at-
tempted to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia. The company de-
murred to the allegations, insisting that the President was not
authorized by the Constitution to make such a proclamation or to
enforce it.' 52 Upholding the power of the President and Congress to
issue such a prohibition, Justice Sutherland explicitly drew a dis-
tinction between the limited domestic authority of the government
and the unfettered reach of its external powers. 5 ' Federal domestic
authority, he held, derives from and is limited by the Constitution."4
External authority, on the other hand, is not so derived, nor is it so
limited:
It results that the investment of the Federal government with the powers
of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The power to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to
make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties,
if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have been
vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of national-
ity .... As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the
United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other
members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not
completely sovereign .... [Many powers not] expressly affirmed by the
Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the con-
ception of nationality. This the court recognized, and.., found the war-
150. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
151. At the time Bolivia and Paraguay were at war. The President was authorized to
enforce this Resolution if he believed it would help to restore peace in the region.
152. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 311-14.
153. Justice Sutherland declared:
It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we first consider the dif-
ferences between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or
external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs. That there
are differences between them, and that these differences are fundamental, may
not be doubted.
Id. at 315.
154. "The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers ex-
cept those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into the effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs." Id. at 315.
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rant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the
law of nations.
55
The idea that this inherent right is found in the law of nations
is intriguing. Justice Sutherland, in drawing upon international
custom and practice to validate his theory, made it clear that the
United States is afforded the privileges of international law. How-
ever, as even the Curtiss-Wright decision made clear, courts have
been reluctant to declare that the federal government is also bound
by the duties of being a member of what Sutherland called the
"family of nations."5 ' Sutherland's opinion demonstrated that the
exclusivity of the foreign relations power in the federal government
is an inherent right and not a constitutional provision.'57
2. The Executive Particularly. The conception that foreign pol-
icy is exclusively an executive matter began with the Framers of the
Constitution.5 In one of the earliest examples of support for this
belief, Thomas Jefferson, upon being greeted by a French diplomat,
made the following statement: "The transaction of business with
foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head
of that department, except as to such portions of it as are specially
submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly."159
A mere ten years later, John Marshall made the proclamation
155. Id. at 318; cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure
Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (declaring that the power of the President to act in national af-
fairs, even when such actions have foreign implications, is not as expansive as his power
to act in a purely international context).
156. United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 318.
157. Not all constitutional scholars agree with the premises of Justice Sutherland's
theory. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946) (arguing that the "inherent rights" doc-
trine is contrary to the concept of a written Constitution). According to Levitan:
a careful check indicates that the whole theory and a great amount of its phra-
seology had become engraved on Mr. Sutherland's mind before he joined the
Court, waiting for an opportunity to be made the law of the land. The circum-
stances show that he had pre-formed opinions on the subject and that when he
spoke in the Curtiss-Wright decision, he did little to reexamine his long cher-
ished ideas.
Id. at 478.
Justice Sutherland had indeed written an earlier article which seemed to predict his
final decision in Curtiss-Wright. See GEORGE SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
158. See SMITH, supra note 139, at 163 ("[]t has been agreed since George Washing-
ton's time that the president is primarily responsible for the conduct of American foreign
relations.").
159. Jefferson's Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Ap-
pointments, April 24, 1790, 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1789-1790 at 378, 379
(Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961). It seems the French diplomat, Gdnet, was sent by the
French Republic with papers addressed to the Congress. Id. at 380-81 (editor's notes).
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that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations .... He
holds and directs the force of the nation."' 6 Although Jefferson and
Marshall were usually in disagreement over the powers of the fed-
eral government, they were in complete accord over the power of the
President in this area.161
Although these two statements obviously had great persuasive
weight, it was not until the Logan Act 162 that the exclusive power of
the President in this area was given any clear legal basis. This Act
gave the President sole authority to meet with foreign powers, thus
allowing the President to forbid a private citizen from meeting with
the French government. 6 Thus, Congress was willing to take action
to uphold the authority of the President in foreign matters.
The Supreme Court, in the early nineteenth century, did not
squarely address the issue of the power of the executive branch to
conduct foreign affairs. In fact, early judicial decisions surrounding
the war-making powers of the executive seemed to limit that
branch's power.' However, the Court did expand the powers of the
executive branch, not by specifically validating expansive action, but
by refusing to consider it.
In particular, the Supreme Court refused to consider the
constitutionality of executive recognitions of foreign states, In
Luther v. Borden, 65 the Supreme Court declined to determine which
160. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
161. See SMITH, supra note 139, at 163 ("Even such constitutional antagonists as
Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall found common ground when it came to the presi-
dent's power in foreign affairs.").
162. See Logan Act, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613 (1799) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 953
(1988)).
163. A Philadelphia Quaker named Logan had traveled to Paris to negotiate with
the French government in an attempt to stop the escalating tensions between the United
States and France. See CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF LAWS PROHIBITING CORRE-
SPONDENCE WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF A COMMISSION, S. DOC.
No. 696, 64th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4-5 (1917).
More recently, the Logan Act was used by President Nixon to prevent Pierre Salin-
ger from meeting with the North Vietnamese in 1972. SMITH, supra note 139, at 163-64.
164. For instance, the Court in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), held
that the executive branch's power to conduct undeclared or limited wars was subject to an
express grant by Congress. In that case, the Court invalidated an executive branch sei-
zure of a foreign vessel as going beyond that which was intended by Congress.
Further, in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), the Court again
viewed executive war-making powers in a restrictive way. In that case, the Court held
that where Congress had passed legislation calling for a "defensive war," the executive
branch was prohibited from conducting an offensive war (seizing enemy property).
165. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see also Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253 (1829) (declaring that the judiciary is not the proper branch of government for de-
termining which treaty should control a land dispute); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat) 610 (1818) (holding that the power to recognize a foreign state is wholly within
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government should be recognized as leading Rhode Island during
Dorr's Rebellion. In refusing to question the government's
determinations as to the recognition of a state, the Court withdrew
from examining a large area of law that ultimately concerns foreign
affairs, and thus granted the executive branch broad non-reviewable
discretion in an important area of foreign affairs.
6
Although early Supreme Court decisions in the area of foreign
affairs are few, the Supreme Court did actively participate in ex-
panding executive branch power within the domestic system. The
powers granted in these decisions have led directly to the vast ex-
pansion of executive branch power in foreign affairs, beginning with
The Paquete Habana and continuing through Alvarez-Machain.
In Martin v. Mott,167 for example, the power of the President to
call out state militias was upheld.' Mott's challenge to the Presi-
dent's authority in this matter was thrown out with the sweeping
statement that the President "is necessarily constituted the judge of
the existence of the exigency, and is bound to act according to his
belief of the facts."6 1 Further, the President's discretion is not sub-
ject to later judicial review. 7'
In The Prize Cases,'7' the Court upheld the power of the Presi-
dent to usurp inherently Congressional powers in times of emer-
gencies.'72 Relying heavily upon the reasoning in Martin v. Mott, the
the domain of the political branches, and specifically the executive).
166. Obviously this case involved the government of one of the states of the union.
However, in determining the power of the executive branch to make such a determina-
tion, the Supreme Court looked to the political branches' constitutional right to conduct
foreign affairs free from judicial intervention.
167. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
168. Id. at 30. Mott, a New York militiaman, was fined $96 by a court martial for
failing to report for service in the War of 1812. After he refused to pay, property equaling
that value was confiscated from him. Mott commenced suit to recover his goods from the
United States Deputy Marshal (Martin) who had carried out the confiscation. In his suit,
Mott claimed, among other things, that the President had abused his position as Com-
mander-in-Chief by usurping Congress' exclusive right to call up the militia. He cited the
Constitutional provision that "Congress shall have Power: ... To provide for calling forth
the Militia. . . ." U. S. CoNsT. art. I, §8; Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 28.
169. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 31.
170. The court also stated that the President and military advisors were immune
from civil suits that would attempt to challenge the wisdom and legality of their orders.
"Such a course would be subversive of all discipline, and expose the best disposed officers
to the chances of ruinous litigation." Id. at 30-31.
171. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
172. At the beginning of the Civil War, April 27, 1861, President Lincoln ordered a
blockade of all Southern ports. It was not until August 6, 1861, that Congress passed leg-
islation validating the President's earlier blockade. During the interim, many neutral
ships were confiscated and their cargo sold as prize. The owners of these vessels brought
suit to recover the value of their ships and cargo, arguing that the blockade could not be
valid without a Congressional declaration of war. Id. at 639-49.
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Court held that the President had the authority to respond to crises
as he saw fit:
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander in Chief, in
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance,
and a civil war of such alarming proportion as will compel him to accord
them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and
this Court must be governed by the decision and acts of the political de-
partment of the Government to which this power was entrusted. "He must
determine the degree of force the crisis demands."173
The powers conferred to the President during the Civil War,
though immense, could be justified by the need for quick and deci-
sive action. However, the President has also been given wide power
to act with impunity even in the absence of an emergency.
Mississippi v. Johnson'7 4 involved the power of President An-
drew Johnson to enforce the Reconstruction Acts immediately fol-
lowing the Civil War.7 5 In upholding the power of the President to
enforce the Acts the Court stated:
[We are unable to perceive that th[e circumstances of this case] take[ the
case out of the general principles which forbid judicial interference with
173. Id. at 670. The Prize Cases resulted in a 5-4 decision. The dissent argued that
Congress alone has the power to declare war, and that since Congress had not done so,
the blockade was invalid:
[Blefore this insurrection against the established Government can be dealt with
on the footing of a civil war, within the meaning of the law of nations and Con-
stitution of the United States,... it must be recognized or declared by the
war-making power of the Government. No power short of this can change the
legal status of the Government or the relations of its citizens from that of peace
to a state of war ....
Id. at 688-89 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Thus, the dissent made an argument based upon international law and the constitu-
tional text. An acceptance of the dissent's argument, though perhaps undesirable for
other reasons, would have supported the system of checks and balances that is inherent
in our government. Instead, the majority gave the President the power to make unilateral
declarations that can affect the nation's state of belligerence:
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist by force. He does not initiate the war, but is
bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organ-
ized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be
'unilateral."
Id. at 668 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 243 (1863) (upholding the power of the President to suspend habeas corpus, and to
try civilians in military courts, during times of emergency). For a short discussion of The
Prize Cases, see SMITH, supra note 139, at 163-75. Smith notes that the holding has been
relied upon to "sustain presidential initiatives from McKinley to Reagan." Id. at 165.
174. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
175. Representatives from Mississippi argued that the Reconstruction Acts
compromised freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Id.
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the exercise of Executive discretion .... The Congress is the legislative
department of the government; the President is the executive department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department.' 7 6
The courts are not always willing to hold that the executive actually
has certain powers that it purports to exercise. Rather than invali-
date the executive action, however, they often avoid deciding the is-
sue at all, through application of the political questions doctrine.
B. The Political Questions Doctrine
The political questions doctrine has been defined as "a magical
formula that has the practical result of relieving a Court of the ne-
cessity of thinking further about a particular problem. It... trans-
fer[s] the problem to another branch... [and] sometimes [leaves]
the problem in mid-air so that no branch decides it." 77 This defini-
tion may be a bit harsh. The doctrine can more generously be de-
fined as an attempt by a court to avoid those issues which it feels
that it cannot or should not decide. There are two motivating factors
behind this decision. First, there is the prudential doctrine that a
court should not decide cases that may jeopardize its power within
the Constitutional system (i.e., those cases where to challenge
Presidential authority may end up forcing the President to ignore
the court altogether). Second, there is the view that there are ques-
tions the court cannot decide because the questions are inherently so
political that they do not give rise to the possibility of judicial rem-
edy.
In many ways, Chief Justice John Marshall is responsible for
the creation of the political questions doctrine. The historical basis
of the doctrine can be found in his most famous decision, Marbury v.
176. Id. at 499-500; see also SIITH, supra note 127, at 166. Smith contends that the
language quoted above is directly attributable to the statement of Attorney General Stan-
bery that:
It is not upon any peculiar immunity that the individual has who happens to be
President; upon any idea that he cannot do wrong; upon any idea that there is
any particular sanctity belonging to him as an individual, .... but it is on ac-
count of the office he holds that.., the President is above the process of any
court... to bring him to account as President.
Id. at 166 (quoting Attorney General Stanbery).
In Smith's opinion, the decision in Mississippi v. Johnson has had the effect of
"placing the president beyond the reach of judicial intervention in the exercise of his offi-
cial powers." Id.; see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (giving the
President immense discretion and power in matters that involve the armed forces, and
holding that the President's "duty and ... power are purely military. As commander-in-
chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by
law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.").
177. John P. Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 36,
37 (Edmond Kahn ed., 1954).
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Madison.7'7 As a natural corollary to the doctrine of judicial review,
Marshall indicated that there are times when courts should not ex-
ercise review. He cited political questions as an example of such a
time:
[Tihe Constitution [gives the President] certain political powers, in the ex-
ercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to
his country in political character, and to his own conscience...
Whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive
discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to con-
trol that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not
individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the
executive is conclusive.
179
The doctrine was strengthened several years later, when Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, given the opportunity to decide an issue of foreign
policy, put his deferential theory into law in Foster v. Neilson.18
Foster involved a series of land transactions among Spain,
France, and the United States. As a result of these transactions, the
parties to the suit both possessed title to the same tracts of land.
Foster's title was declared valid by Spain, and Neilson's was pur-
chased from the United States. In holding for Neilson, Marshall de-
clared that foreign policy questions were inherently "more political
than legal"'8 ' and should be left to the President and Congress:
In a controversy between two nations concerning boundary, it is scarcely
possible that the Courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures
adopted by its own government... The judiciary is not that department of
the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign
powers is confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual
rights, according to those principles which the political departments of the
nation have established... it is the province of the Court to conform its
decisions to the will of the legislature.
8 2
178. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (declaring that the judiciary has the right to
review the constitutionality of acts of Congress and the President).
179. Id. at 164-65.
180. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 308 (1829).
181. Id. at 308. Spain ceded the Louisiana territory to France by the treaty of St.
Ildefonso (1800). In turn, France, by the treaty of Paris (1803), ceded it to the United
States for a sum of money. Id. at 301. The United States claimed lands that fell between
the Iberville and Perdido rivers, then known as West Florida and what today makes up
the Gulf Coast of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana east of the Mississippi River. Id. at
308-09. Spain, on the other hand, contended that the treaty of St. Ildefonso applied only
to that territory west of the Mississippi River and the island of New Orleans. Foster and
Elam, plaintiffs, were granted title to land in the disputed area by the King of Spain in
1804. Id. at 310. Neilson also held title to that land. The Supreme Court declared that the
United States' interpretation of the treaty was all that mattered in United States courts,
and dismissed the suit. Id. at 314.
182. Id. at 308.
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Thus, the Court's most famous voice began a process that has
continued until today. It is a process whereby the judiciary, in an
attempt to keep the branches of the government separate, has not
only deferred to the executive in areas of foreign policy, but in so de-
ferring has greatly increased the executive's sway over all affairs
considered foreign.
In 1839, the Supreme Court declared in Williams v. Suffolk In-
surance Company183 that "it is not material to inquire, nor is it the
province of the Court to determine, whether the executive be right or
wrong. It is enough to know, that in the exercise of his constitutional
functions, he has decided the question."'4 In 1978, when President
Carter repudiated America's Mutual Defense Treaty with the Re-
public of China (Taiwan) on his own authority, the Supreme Court
declined to review the question,"5 even though the matter clearly
involved questions about the role of the legislative branch. 86
183. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839). In this case, Great Britain and Buenos Ayres had
both claimed sovereignty over the Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands. Buenos Ayres took con-
trol of the islands in 1829, but the United States government refused to recognize the
claim. Subsequently, two American ships, the Harriet and the Breakwater, were seized
for fishing in the territorial waters of the Falklands in defiance of a ban declared by Bue-
nos Ayres. Id. at 416. The owners of the ships attempted to recover from their insurers,
Suffolk Insurance, but the insurer refused to allow recovery. The insurer's refusal was
based upon the theory that the shipowner had taken the risk of losing his ship by defying
the Buenos Ayres ban. The Court held that the shipowner was not bound to heed the ban,
for according to the United States government:
If these islands are not within the jurisdiction of the Buenos Ayrean go-
vernment, the power assumed and exercised... was unauthorized, and the
[ship's] master was not bound to regard it.
[Ilt is the opinion of this Court, 1st, That, inasmuch as the American go-
vernment has insisted and still does insist... that the Falkland Islands do not
constitute any part of... Buenos Ayres, the action of the American government
on this subject is binding ... as to whom the sovereignty of those islands be-
longs.
Id. at 421-22.
184. Id. at 420 (emphasis added). Note that the Court refers to the President's
"constitutional functions," even though the powers granted in this case are clearly ex-
tra-constitutional.
185. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). This case involved a constitutional
challenge by Senator Goldwater and others to the President's authority to terminate a
treaty without Senate approval. The treaty in question was a mutual defense treaty with
the Republic of China (Taiwan). Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, stating:
"In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a
treaty ... the instant case in my view... must surely be controlled by political stan-
dards." Id. at 1003.
186. Goldwater and the other Senators felt that the repudiation of a treaty should be
subject to the same considerations involved in adopting a treaty. The Senators pointed
specifically to the constitutional provision regarding the ratification of treaties: "[The
President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2;
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Other important applications of the political questions doctrine
have included: the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to entertain
arguments about the constitutionality of the Vietnam War 8' despite
Constitutional text involving Congress' exclusive right to declare
war; '8 the President's complete civil immunity for actions taken
while President;8 9 the ability to deny access to federal courts to
those with claims against foreign governments; 9 ' the authority to
order certain American citizens evacuated and incarcerated in time
of war;'' and even the unlimited power to keep secret matters in-
volving foreign affairs' 9
From the above, it is apparent that the most important role for
the political questions doctrine can be found in areas that involve
foreign policy. Although the doctrine may legitimately be employed
to allow the Court the opportunity to evade issues which it either
has no real business deciding, or prudently should avoid consider-
ing, it also has the danger of allowing the Supreme Court to avoid
making tough decisions about the propriety of governmental con-
duct.
C. Summary
The retreat of the judiciary, though arguably prudent in many
of the above cases, has not been without its deleterious conse-
quences. In particular, the effect of the above decisions has been to
surrender vast areas of judicial review to the sole discretion and
judgment of the President. This has been the practice of the Court
from the time of Jefferson to the present day, and shows no sign of
abating. Though the legitimate need for a single voice in foreign af-
fairs is one which seems self-evident, if anything truly can be so, the
Supreme Court's continuing deference towards the executive branch
has progressed from merely deferring to the President on matters of
policy, to allowing him to violate international law with impunity.1 93
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 999-1000. Goldwater felt that the cancellation of a treaty
must also be subject to a two-thirds vote of the Senate.
187. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819, 819 (D.D.C. 1966), affd, 373
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967) (involving soldier who sought in-
junction preventing Secretary of Defense from sending him to Vietnam; dismissing action
sua sponte because it raised an "obviously political question that is outside the judicial
function").
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
189. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
190. Dames v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
191. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
192. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v.
Waterman, 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
193. See supra part III.B.2.
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Such is the legacy and effect of Alvarez-Machain.
The Supreme Court has not only allowed the President to vio-
late international law, but seems to have fully supported him. Al-
though the judiciary may be justified in deferring to the executive
Branch under domestic law, such deference cannot be tolerated
when it involves violations of international law. This is a direct con-
sequence of the United States' duties and responsibilities as a mem-
ber of the "family of nations."
V. THE HISTORIC APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Law of Nations in Common Law England and the Original
Thirteen Colonies
The Law of Nations has long been part of the law of the land in
both England and the United States. Drawing on the writings of
Grotius, Burlamaqui, Pufendorf, Vattel, and others,194 early English
jurists did not view international law and domestic law as separable
entities, but rather as two enunciations of the law of nature.9'9 This
commonly accepted perception of the essence of international law
made its acceptance into the domestic courts very easy.
The incorporation of the law of nature into English domestic
law is clear from Dr. Bonham's Case.96 In that case, Lord Coke de-
clared that "an act of Parliament [that] is against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common
law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void."' 97 In Calvin's
Case,19' he further declared:
1. That ligeance or obedience of the subject to the Sovereign is due by the
law of nature: 2. That this law of nature is part of the laws of England: 3.
That the law of nature was before any judicial or municipal law in the
world: 4. That the law of nature is immutable, and cannot be changed. 99
These cases confirmed the widely held view that acts of the legisla-
ture could not validly contravene the law of nature. Because inter-
194. See generally J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINcIPLEs OF NATURAL AND PoLITIc LAW
(Thomas Nugent trans., 2d. ed. 1763); EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE RIGHTS OF MEN (1758);
HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PAcis (Francis N. Kelrey trans., 1964); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (Charles H. Oldfather & William A.
Oldfather trans., 1934).
195. Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 35 (1952) [hereinafter Dickenson, 11; Jules Lobel,
The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (1985).
196. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
197. Id. at 652.
198. 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (C.P. 1610).
199. Id. at 382.
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national law is derived from and defined by the law of nature, the
Parliament also had no right to contravene it or to attempt to
change it. 20
0
This view was confirmed almost two hundred years later by
Lord Stowell, when he declared that
[iun the first place it is to be recollected that this is a Court of the Law of
Nations, though sitting here under the authority of the King of Great
Britain. It belongs to other nations as well as to our own; and what for-
eigners have a right to demand from it, is the administration of the Law of
Nations, simply, and exclusively of the introductions of principles bor-
rowed from our own municipal jurisprudence, to which, it is well known,
they have at all times expressed no inconsiderable repugnance.
20 1
The great Lord Mansfield gave his approval to this view when
he declared that [t]he privileges of public ministers and their reti-
nue depend upon the law of nations; which is part of the common
law of England. And the Act of Parliament... did not intend to al-
ter, nor can alter the law of nations."22 Thus, "there never was any
doubt that the Law of Nations was part of the law of England."20 3
In much the same way, the early history of United States law is
linked inexorably with the Law of Nations. It is generally held that
the realization of independence from England gave the United
States the privileges and duties of the Law of Nations. This is most
readily apparent in the Declaration of Independence.
The Declaration posited that "these United Colonies are, and of
200. See Lobel, supra note 195, at 1081-82.
201. The Recovery, 165 Eng. Rep. 955, 958 (Adm. 1807).
202. Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50 (IKB. 1767) (emphasis added). The
act that Lord Mansfield is referring to is the Act of Anne. This act was passed following
the arrest in London of the Russian ambassador for indebtedness. The act made it a
criminal offense to interfere with foreign ambassadors or public ministers. 7 ANNE, ch. 12
(1708). Blackstone posited that the statute was
not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory
of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom; without which it must
cease to be a part of the civilized world ....
As to the rights of ambassadors, which are also established by the law of
nations,... [iut may here be sufficient to remark, that the common law of Eng-
land recognizes them in their full extent .... And, the more effectually to en-
force the law of nations in this respect, when violated through wantonness or
insolence, it is declared, by the statute 7 Anne, c. 12, that all process whereby
the person of any ambassador, or of his domestic or domestic servant, may be
arrested, or his goods distrained or seized, shall be utterly null and void; and
that all persons prosecuting, soliciting, or executing such process, being con-
victed, by confession or the oath of one witness.., shall be deemed violators of
the laws of nations, and disturbers of the public repose.
4 WLLmiA BLAcKsToNE, CoMMENTARIEs *67, *70-71.
203. Dickinson, supra note 195, at 32 (referring to the argument of Lord Mansfield
as counsel in Barbuit's Case, 25 Eng. Rep. 777 (Oh. 1735)).
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right ought to be, Free and Independent States [and] as Free and
Independent States, they have the full power to levy war, conclude
peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts
and things which Independent States may of right do."204 These
"rights" as free and independent states were derived from the Law of
Nations, which granted each free and independent state certain
powers and privileges. Thus the very document giving birth to the
nation declared that it assumed the privileges, and conversely the
duties, found in the law of nations.
Early judicial decisions echoed this assumption. Judge McKean
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explicated this principle of
American jurisprudence both before and after the adoption of the
Constitution. In Respublica v. De Longchamps, °5 McKean found
that a case involving the law of nations was
a case of first impression in the United States. It must be determined on
the principles of the laws of nations, which form a part of the municipal
law of Pennsylvania; and, if the offences charged in the indictment have
been committed, there can be no doubt, that those laws have been vio-
lated.0 6
Later, in Ross v. Rittenhouse,07 McKean wrote:
[T]he law of nations, or of nature and reason, is in arbitrary states en-
forced by the royal power, in others, by the municipal law of the country;
which latter may, I conceive, facilitate or improve the execution of its de-
cisions, by any means they shall think best, provided the great universal
law remains unaltered.20 8
Similarly, in Henfield's Case,0 9 the Federal Circuit Court
stated that "sovereign[s] hav[e] no right to command what is con-
trary to the law of nature,"210 thereby intimating that executive ac-
tions which abrogate international law are null and void. This was
more forcefully declared by Peter Duponceau, the lawyer who repre-
sented Henfield:
204. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 35 (U.S. 1776).
205. 1 Dall. 111 (Pa. 1784). This case involved an assault against the French Lega-
tion at the port of Philadelphia. The defendant was found to be guilty of "an infraction of
the law of nations" and was handed a stiff sentence. See Dickinson, supra note 195, at
33-34.
206. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dali. at 114.
207. 2 Dall. 160 (Pa. 1792).
208. Id. at 162.
209. 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360). This case involved an American
citizen charged with violating the United States' neutrality by serving on a French priva-
teer during France's war with Great Britain and Spain. Chief Justice Jay felt that the
citizen could be found guilty of an offense against the common law.
210. Id. at 1104.
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The law of nations, being the common law of the civilized world, may be
said, indeed, to be a part of the law of every civilized nation; but it stands
on other and higher grounds than municipal customs, statutes, edicts, or
ordinances. It is binding on every people and every government .... Every
branch of the national administration, each within its district and its par-
ticular jurisdiction is bound to administer it. It defines offences and af-
fixes punishments, and acts everywhere proprio rigore, whenever it is not
altered or modified by particular national statutes, or usages not inconsis-
tent with its great and fundamental principles .... [Tihis universal com-
mon law can never cease to be the rule of executive and judicial proceed-
ings until mankind shall return to the savage state.21'
Mr. Duponceau might be surprised to learn that according to
his definition the United States has returned to "the savage state."
Applications of the law of nations within the domestic system
were particularly plentiful in areas of admiralty and maritime law.
In 1793, in Talbot v. Johnson2 12 the Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether the seizure of a Dutch vessel by Americans priva-
teering for France violated American neutrality in the war between
France and England. The Supreme Court declared that the seizure
violated international law and therefore was a "violation of our law
(I mean the common law, of which the law of nations is a
part . . .. ).1)213
Later, in 1815, the Supreme Court was asked in The Nereide21 4
to decide whether a Spanish merchant's goods were exempt from
seizure by American privateers when those goods were being trans-
ported on a British vessel. The Court held that since Spain was
neutral in the war between England and the United States, goods of
Spanish citizens were exempt from seizure. In so declaring, Chief
Justice Marshall was not swayed by the fact that Spain did not treat
American goods as being exempt in like circumstances. Refusing to
alter the law of nations to include an American right to retaliate
against Spain for its treatment of American citizens, Marshall de-
clared that the "court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part
of the law of the land."215
Applications of international law, or the law of nations, were to
be found in numerous cases concerning such topics as slavery, 21 pi-
racy,217 and maritime law.218 In each and every one of these cases,
211. Id. at 1122 n.6.
212. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
213. Id. at 161 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
214. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
215. Id. at 423.
216. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (declaring that slavery was not
prohibited by the law of nations).
217. See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820) (holding that
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the Court applied international law as an independent source of law
distinct from constitutional or common law principles.
The belief of early American courts that the law of nations was
applicable in domestic courts seems clear. However, the historical
record is not confined to such evidence alone. The Constitution itself
anticipates domestic application of international law.
B. The Law of Nations and Article III
A brief review of the Constitutional Convention provides clear
authority for the proposition that the United States judiciary was
established with the goal of adjudicating "infractions of treaties or of
the law of nations."219 The various state plans for a constitution all
agreed on one point: that the national judiciary should be given ju-
risdiction to enforce all areas of international law.220
The language of the Constitution echoes this belief. The judicial
power of the United States was to be vested "in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."22' The jurisdiction of these courts was de-
clared to include:
[All Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion; ... In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
2 22
That the Framers intended this language to encompass the ju-
piracy was a crime against all nations); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610
(1818) (declaring that piracy was a well defined crime under international law and did not
need further clarification by Congress). For a deeper discussion of these and other piracy
cases, see G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy
Cases, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
218. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 658 (1874); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); The Schooner Adeline & Cargo, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
244 (1815); see also William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
219. Madison's Notes in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19
(Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also McHenry's Notes in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra at 25 (quoting Edmund Randolph's enumeration of the de-
fects of the Articles of Confederation as outlined in the Virginia Plan).
220. See Dickinson, I, supra note 195, at 37-46; Lobel, supra note 195, at 1094-1102.
221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
222. Id. at art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
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diciary's responsibility to apply the law of nations is evident from
their statements. Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued that
"having taken our station among nations and having claimed the
benefit of the laws which regulate them, [the United States] must in
our turn be bound by the same laws."223
The common law heritage of the law of nations is codified in the
Constitution: the law of nations is part of the law of the United
States. The national judiciary was created to be the arbiter of that
law and to ensure its application and enforcement. Any other inter-
pretation is simply inconsistent with the fundamental understand-
ings and wishes of the Framers. Yet, as Alvarez-Machain has shown,
the later treatment of international law in United States courts has
been in clear derogation of these principles.
VI. PROBLEMS FACING A MODERN APPLICATION OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The preceding sections have put forth the argument that gov-
ernmentally sponsored forcible abductions violate customary inter-
national law. Further, they have argued that the Framers, in creat-
ing an independent federal judiciary, had in mind the establishment
of a judicial body that would have jurisdiction over and would apply
international law against state and federal governments in appro-
priate circumstances. In other words, an examination of the consti-
tutional system envisioned by the Framers produces on undeniable
result - there is no constitutional bar to an application of interna-
tional law by the federal judiciary to invalidate actions of the state
and federal governments that violate that law.
Unfortunately, this conclusion does not end the discussion.
Over the course of time, a number of practical and theoretical factors
have worked to frustrate any expansion of the domestic application
of customary international law. Many of these reasons, however, are
no longer historically valid, and others were logically flawed from
the beginning.
223. 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAILTON 550 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961). Ham-
ilton also declared that:
As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in
any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will
follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which
the citizens of other countries are concerned.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 536 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
John Jay echoed these sentiments by stating that "[tihe wisdom of the Convention,
in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and
responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended." THE
FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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A. Historical Factors
1. Tradition of Non-Application. One of the most difficult as-
pects surrounding the issue of the status of customary international
law in the United States is the lack of clear judicial precedent. The
dearth of judicial decisions in this area can be attributed to older
cases that attribute expansive powers to the federal government as a
whole and the executive in particular, or to judicial avoidance of
such questions through broad use of the political questions doctrine.
Some commentators, however, have taken this historical
"reluctance" of the judiciary as a sign, in itself, of the inadequacy
and inappropriateness of customary international law as a basis for
judicial review of foreign policy actions. They have argued that the
judiciary has not broadly applied customary international law be-
cause judges "understand" that customary international law is an
inappropriate basis for invalidating government action.224 In many
ways, these commentators share the views of William Barr, Abra-
ham Sofaer, and the Justice Department about the power of the ex-
ecutive branch to violate international law. However, unlike Barr
and Sofaer, these commentators do not find an explicit grant of
power by the judiciary;2" instead, they look at the fact that
"American courts have rarely applied customary international law,
and have almost never applied it as a direct restraint against a gov-
ernment or a governmental interest"2 6 to come to the conclusion
that "the federal court's reluctance [to apply customary interna-
tional law] obviously reflects a belief "227 or "shows a clear trend"228
224. See, e.g., Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the
Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 143
(1984); Trimble, supra note 86; Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Matorin, supra note 6; see also
Extraterritorial Enforcement Activities, supra note 4; International Law, supra note 4.
225. See discussion of Barr and Sofaer's views, supra part III.B.2.
226. Trimble, supra note 86, at 684. Trimble argues:
Of more than 2000 "international law" cases decided between 1789 and 1984,
less than fifty involved the application of customary law when the executive
branch had not expressed an opinion... [and] even the small number of cust-
omary law cases is deceptively high. Most of those cases are relatively old and an
examination of the entire body of cases shows a clear trend away from judicial
determination of legal rules and a movement toward judicial deference to politi-
cal branch direction.
Id. at 685-87 (emphasis added); see also Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1226-31. Weisburd
argues that there are only "five cases from the general period in question [that] include
language that would appear to support the argument that the law of nations was seen as
falling within the 'law of the United States.'" Id. at 1226. Weisburd's view of customary
international law is that it is binding on the executive branch only if it is included in the
Constitution's definition of "laws" inherent in the President's obligation to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
227. Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1268.
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that the judiciary understands that customary international law
should not hold an important place in American jurisprudence. In
the end, judicial reluctance to apply international law brings these
commentators to the conclusion that
whatever slim support there may have been in the early part of this cen-
tury for the [belief that] ... customary international law [restrains execu-
tive action] ... has largely vanished... [and thus], the lesson is clear:
there is no historical basis for the proposition that courts in fact restrain
the government through the application of customary international law.22
9
Although the exact analysis, or theoretical approach, on this is-
sue differs from person to person, the argument is still the same:
historical analysis demonstrates that cases involving judicial appli-
cation of customary international law are few and far between; such
judicial disinclinations must be attributable to judges' beliefs in the
inadequacy, either practically or theoretically, of customary inter-
national law; therefore, modern applications of that law are simi-
larly foreclosed.
The absurdity of some aspects of this line of reasoning is obvi-
ous. The mere fact that the judiciary has historically been timid in
its use of customary international law does not preclude its rebirth
through an awakening of judicial minds to the law's value and im-
portance. A perfect example of judicial neglect being rectified can be
gleaned from the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ratified in
1868, the Fourteenth Amendment made possible the application of
many protections found in the Bill of Rights to the states. However,
it took nearly 100 years before the courts began to see the power to
effect social change through the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20
A further criticism of this approach to customary international
law is that the historical reasons for judicial reticence in this area
are not necessarily attributable to deliberate decisions by judges as
to the practical or theoretical weight that customary international
228. Trimble, supra note 86, at 687.
229. Id. at 687, 701.
230. The best example of the disuse of the Fourteenth Amendment can be seen in
the judicial use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871). Passed in 1871, § 1983 was intended to aid in-
dividuals in bringing civil actions against state and local governments that violated their
civil rights. However, "United States Code Annotated notes only 19 decisions under the
section in its first 65 years on the statute books." Note, Limiting Section 1983 Action in
the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1486, 1486 n.4 (1969).
It was not until the Court's landmark decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), that § 1983 began to see major application. In 1960, approximately 300 suits were
brought under § 1983, but by 1982 the number had swelled to more than 17,000.
To argue that the courts are precluded from applying § 1983, merely because it had
largely been ignored for much of its history, would be baseless and patently ridiculous.
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law deserves. Instead, judicial disuse of customary international law
can be attributed to particular historical events and perceptions that
may not have continuing validity.
2. Early Political Disputes. One of the most influential histori-
cal events in the evolution of American politics and jurisprudence
was the rise of party politics in the early federal government and the
divisive impact of American neutrality in the war between France
and Great Britain. In particular, the political clashes between the
Federalists and the Republicans over American neutrality in the
war between France and Europe resulted in the destruction of im-
portant jurisdictional aspects over the law of nations, including the
courts' ability to hear individual violations of the law of nations
under their common-law jurisdiction.23'
The defining moment in the fight between the Federalists and
the Republicans came during the early 1790's with France's "new"
war between Great Britain and her continental allies. On April 22,
1793, President Washington issued his Neutrality Proclamation,2
declaring America's neutrality in the war. In that proclamation,
Washington felt it necessary to include sanctions, grounded in in-
ternational law, for individuals who violated America's neutrality.
Ostensibly, these sanctions were intended "to prevent American citi-
zens from participating on one side or the other; without such a
statement disavowing [and punishing] the actions of enterprising or
enthusiastic citizens, the--country might find itself drawn into a
conflict it wanted to avoid." m However, Washington's decision to
couch individual liability for violations of the neutrality in the law of
nations was to create a division between the Federalists and Repub-
licans that still has consequences today.
Washington authorized American authorities to punish all per-
sons "who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the powers at war,
or any of them." 21 4 Lacking a statute under which he could prosecute
violators of the neutrality, Washington turned to the law of nations
231. For a deeper discussion of this subject, see John Zvesper, American Political
Parties and Constitutional Government, in REFLECTIONs ON THE CONSTITUTION 148, 149-
54 (Richard Maidment & John Zvesper eds., 1989); Stewart Jay, The Origins of Federal
Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1042-113 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, One];
see also Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, HI, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 792, 793-95 (1953) ("national jurisdiction at common
law offenses against the Law of Nations was thus virtually to die a-borning, in political
controversies .... ."); Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1213-14.
232. AMi. STATE PAPERS I, 45.
233. DANIEL G. LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 87 (1985).
234. A. STATE PAPERS I, 45.
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to so prosecute. Such a decision was neither new nor controversial.235
Colonial American courts and United States courts under both the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution had long held juris-
diction to prosecute individuals for violations of the law of nations.236
However, prosecutions under the law of nations connected with the
proclamation produced tremendous political fallout. The Federalists,
who fully supported America's neutrality, saw the prosecutions as
the only way to prevent individuals from plunging the country into
war. 37 Republicans, on the other hand, decried the neutrality as a
betrayal of France and declared that the "Administration [had] de-
sert[ed] the cause of liberty."2m 8
The issue was to come to a head in the Administration's prose-
cution of Gideon Henfield for serving as prize master aboard the
French privateer Citoyen Gdnet. The Grand Jury was called to bring
an indictment against Henfield. At the grand jury hearing, Justice
Wilson outlined the charges:
No offense was detailed as to its elements, but Wilson indicated that cap-
turing British prizes was an infraction against the law of nations (which
he said was based on natural law) and a violation of a citizen's duty to the
United States. Under the former the United States was obligated not to
lend the use of its ports to privateers, and this law of nations was binding
on country and citizen alike .... 239
Henfield was ultimately acquitted by the jury. The Republicans
235. See Jay, One, supra note 231, at 1039 ("In the early years [of the Republic],
there was little if any public notice of these prosecutions.").
236. Id.
237. Thomas Jefferson, as part of the Federalist government, explained the go-
vernment's position:
Treaties are law. By the treaty with England we are in a state of peace with
her. He who breaks that peace, if within our jurisdiction, breaks the laws, and is
punishable by them. And if he is punishable he ought to be punished, because
no citizen should be free to commit his country to war.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), reprinted in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 18 (Henry A. Washington ed., 1856).
Earlier that same year, Chief Justice Jay charged the jury in Henfield: "they who
commit, aid, or abet hostilities .. offend against the laws of the United States, and ought
to be punished .... " Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1102-04 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No.
6360). Included in the definition of the laws of the United States was the law of nations.
As Professor Jay has noted, "[tihe thrust of Jay's remarks was that violators of neutrality
harmed the nation itself, since '[t]he peace, prosperity, and reputation of the United
States, will always greatly depend on their fidelity to their engagements.'" Jay, supra
note 231, at 1045 (quotingHenfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1101 (Grand Jury Charge of Jay, Circuit
Justice)).
238. Jay, One, supra note 231, at 1044 (citing LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN
PERSUASION: EvOLUTION OFA PARTY IDEOLOGY 212 (1978)).
239. Id. at 1049 (citing Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1108 (Grand Jury Charge of Wilson,
Circuit Justice)).
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were ecstatic and took the opportunity to blast the Federalists for
bringing "politically motivated" charges against an individual that
were unfounded in law or the Constitution.24 In the end, the power
of the government to bring common law charges against individuals,
whether grounded in the law of nations or other sources, was struck
down by the Court's decision in United States v. Hudson & Good-
win.24' The Republicans had won the "political" battle, but the rejec-
tion of common law crimes, and the concomitant jurisdiction to hear
cases involving the law of nations, had little or nothing to do with a
conscious and deliberate choice by judges that international law was
disfavored. That "the reaction to Henfield was'mainly a product of
its political subject matter" 2 is undeniable.
Although the controversy surrounding Henfield and Hudson &
Goodwin did not involve the foreign relations power of the federal
government or the executive branch, the rationale underlying the
decision led to a widespread view among jurists that "general" laws,
like the law of nations, were to be disfavored. The rationale underly-
ing the repudiation of the common law was that laws not derived
from authoritative sources were not proper bases for judicial deci-
sionmaking.24'
The law of nations, as it existed up until the 1940's, was almost
purely customary in nature. Customary norms were found in the
practice of states, or were believed to be part of the Divine Order in
the law of nations. As such, judges who applied international law
were forced to find the law from one of two sources-the law of na-
ture or state practice. The fact that judges were applying non-codi-
fied law left the judiciary open to criticism that it was applying non-
authoritative law. It is precisely this basis for judicial decisionmak-
240. Id. at 1052. "[The Republican newspapers 'universally asked "what law had
been offended, and under what statute was the indictment supported?"'" Henfield, 11 F.
Cas. at 1123 n.7 (quoting JOHN MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASINGTON 273-74 (1807)).
241. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (declaring that it had "long been settled in public
opinion" that there is no federal common law of crimes). The Court's decision in Hudson
& Goodwin was later reaffirmed in United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415
(1816).
242. Jay One, supra note 231, at 1063. See also Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal
Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1323 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Two]:
The most we can conclude from a survey of jurisdictional theory from the Hud-
son period is that it was generally conceded that federal courts had what we
would term significant common-law powers. From that conclusion we can de-
duce nothing about the authority federal courts ought to be assuming today.
Hudson was decided in a peculiar setting of partisan disturbance, and grew out
of a fear that we can scarcely appreciate today-the belief that there was a
scheme afoot to install a consolidated national government through incorpora-
tion of the British common law.
Id.
243. See generally Weisburd, supra note 224.
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ing that was repudiated in Hudson & Goodwin. However, this
"theoretical" objection carries little weight today.
Since 1945, the basis of international law has become largely
codified.2" Although customary international law is not based upon
written obligations, its development and nature are easily drawn
from the vast number of multinational treaties that exist today. At
the very least, in the case of forcible abductions, the number of in-
ternational documents declaring the rights of individuals and states
under international law makes clear that such abductions are viola-
tive of customary international law. ' 5 Such a finding does not re-
quire the judiciary to employ unfamiliar juridical tools. Customary
international law has moved far closer to a "positivistic" notion of
law than existed in the nineteenth century.
3. The Rise of Positivism. Another possible explanation for the
reluctance of judges to fully utilize international law, throughout the
nineteenth century and on into the present, was the rise of positiv-
istic attitudes about the legitimacy of law, coupled with expansive
concepts of sovereignty and national power. In particular, "[tihe rise
of positivism in Western political and legal theory, especially from
the latter part of the 18th century to the early part of the 20th cen-
tury, corresponds to the steady rise of the national state and its in-
creasingly absolute claims to legal and political supremacy."246
For hundreds of years, theories of international law were
founded in concepts of a "natural law."247 Although legal philoso-
phers differed as to the sources of laws, 5 this theory held that laws
derived from natural sources were of general application and acted
as limits on sovereign power. A review of the cases discussed above
clearly demonstrates that the early American judiciary was steeped
244. See LOUIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW at xvii-xxxi (3d ed. 1993).
245. See supra part III.A.
246. HENKIN, supra note 244, at xxiv-xxvii; see also Lobel, supra note 195, at 1112
("By the latter part of the nineteenth century, positivism had almost entirely replaced
natural law theory in the international arena.").
For discussions on the demise of natural law as the basis for judicial decisionmaking
and its subsequent replacement by positivism, see HENKIN, supra note 244, at mdiv-xxvii;
Lobel, supra note 195; Dickinson, 1, supra note 195; Jay, One, supra note 231.
247. For a list of the most important works declaring natural law, orjus naturale, to
be the philosophical theory underlying international law, see sources listed in supra note
194.
248. The basic disagreement revolved around issues of divinity. In particular, sev-
eral thinkers argue that the source of all laws is God and that these laws are "partly re-
flected in the law of nature, a body of permanent principles grounded in the Divine Order,
and partly revealed in the Scripture." HENKN, supra note 244, at xxiv.
In opposition to this school of thought were scholars like Grotius and Pufendorf, who,
as rationalists, "derive[d] the principles of the law of nature from universal reason rather
than from divine authority." Id.
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in a philosophy of natural law." 9 However, for various reasons' °
natural law theory was slowly abandoned in favor of a positivistic
theory of laws:
Although positivism has a number of different meanings and nuances, its
essential meaning in the theory and development of international law is
reliance on the practice of states and the conduct of international relations
as evidenced by customs or treaties, as against the derivation of norms
from basic metaphysical principles.
251
The rise of positivism produced two related and important beliefs:
first, that rules not derived from a "definite source" were not really
"laws" as that term is meant to be defined; and second, that inter-
national law is valid only insofar as sovereigns have expressly ac-
cepted its application.252
The most explicit manifestation of the belief that laws not de-
rived from definite sources are somehow suspect, can be seen in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hudson & Goodwin253 and Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins.254 In both of these cases, the Supreme Court not
only formulated a very restrictive view as to the justiciability of fed-
eral common law, but also "dictate[d] a particular way of thinking
about the authority of the federal courts. Erie [and Hudson &
Goodwin] rejectfed] the notion that law can exist without being de-
rived from some definite authority.... "255 Further, various codifica-
tion movements throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries betray a theoretical uneasiness with non-codified law-a
product of the rise of positivism.
2 56
Prior to World War HI, international law was almost completely
uncodified. As the theory underlying international law changed from
a natural law basis to a more positivistic theory, the legitimacy and
enforceability of non-codified, or customary, international law began
to be questioned. 257 In particular, scholars and judges began to view
international law as constituting little more than "positive moral-
249. See supra part V.A.
250. See generally Jay, One, supra note 231; Jay, Two, supra note 242.
251. HENKIN, supra note 244, at xxv.
252. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832);
GEORGE W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND STATE (1806).
253. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
254. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
255. Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1237 (emphasis added); see also MORTON J.
HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977).
256. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDiAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-07
(2d ed. 1985); JOHN HONNOLD, THE LIFE OF THE LAW 100-45 (1964).
257. Weisburd, supra note 244, at 1235-39; see also Dickinson, I, supra note 195;
Dickinson, II, supra note 231.
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ity."18 Although this view was not universally held,25 9 it most cer-
tainly affected the role that customary international law was al-
lowed to play in many American courtrooms.
A further consequence of the rise of positivism was its effect on
the role of state power in the international order. Put simply, if all
laws must come from a definite source, and international law is
nothing more than the custom of states, 2 0 then international law is
not law at all. As the belief in the inadequacy of international law to
meet positivistic definitions of law spread, so did judicial attitudes
about the impropriety of applying it to invalidate governmental ac-
tion.
In the end, "[p]ositivism, gaining steadily in influence through-
out the nineteenth century, resolved the balance in favor of sover-
eign power... and negat[ed] limitations on sovereignty."2" 1 As judi-
cial attitudes about the power of state sovereignty changed to in-
clude beliefs in the nearly absolute power of the state, cases of in-
ternational law began to take on political significance. Specifically,
the judiciary began to view international law as merely a manifes-
tation of political power, and thus was unwilling to apply that law in
any way that derogated from the directives of the political
branches. 62 In the end, the rise of positivism coupled with notions of
state sovereignty forced the judiciary to change the way it viewed
customary international law.263 The political branches were given
258. HENKIN, supra note 244, at xxvi. According to Henkin:
John Austin... [who] dominated jurisprudential thinking in the common law
world in the 19th century, regarded a command emanating from a definite su-
perior and punitive sanction enforcing the command as indispensable elements
of law. He therefore relegated international law to the status of "positive moral-
ity."
Id.
259. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text (noting that courts deciding pi-
racy and admiralty cases continued to give international law specific application).
260. HENKIN, supra note 244, at xxvi.
261. Lobel, supra note 195, at 1113; see HENKIN, supra note 244, at xxvi ("It was
impossible to justify international law under state sovereignty theory, except as norms
voluntarily accepted by sovereign states."); see also In re Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432
(1922); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874).
262. See generally Charles D. Siegal, Deference and its Dangers: Congress' Power to
'Define ... Offences Against the Law of Nations," 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865 (1988);
Weisburd, supra note 224.
263. Because of the Constitutional provisions concerning treaties, these have been
treated rather differently than customary international law and have thus received
greater attention in the courts. However, the rise of positivism did have an impact even
on the role of treaties in the domestic system. Specifically, Professor Jules Lobel has at-
tributed to positivism the belief that federal statues enacted later in time can supersede
treaties:
International legal theory in the eighteenth century sought a balance between
natural law absolutes and the need for flexible exercise of sovereign powers.
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wide, and at times all-encompassing,2' discretion in their conduct of
foreign affairs. In those few instances when cases of "proper" judicial
disposition arose, the courts generally acquiesced to political branch
direction.265
4. The Growth of American Power. A final factor which may
have contributed to the relative demise of customary international
law in America is of a purely pragmatic and political nature. In es-
sence, the evolving position of the United States in the international
system forced the judiciary to view international law at the begin-
ning of the Republic in a radically different manner than it did when
the United States became a world leader and military power.
In the early years following the Declaration of Independence,
the newly declared United States found itself in a precarious posi-
tion within the world community."' Foreign policy in the early
United States operated with hostile neighbors to the North and
South (England and Spain), and an ever present awareness of the
relatively weak military position of the United States on the inter-
national scene.26 Understandably, therefore, the judiciary was con-
stantly monitoring the activities of American citizens and the Amer-
ican government to ensure that it acted within the bounds of inter-
national law.268 The political branches, aware of their precarious
position, were equally wary not to violate the law of nations and
thus give their enemies just cause for retaliation. In this way, the
political and judicial branches acted in concert. 9
However, as the economic and military might of the United
States grew, and the political and military might of Spain and Eng-
land in the Americas declined, the political need for adherence to
international law evaporated. As the political need lessened, so the
judiciary began to view international law and its restrictions on the
expansive aspirations of the United States as an impediment to Am-
Positivism, gaining steadily in influence throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, resolved the balance in favor of sovereign power. By negating limitations
on sovereignty, positivism supported both the power of a state to revoke treaties
and the superiority of statutes over customary international law.
Lobel, supra note 195, at 1113.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
265. See Trimble, supra note 86; Siegal, supra note 262.
266. LANG, supra note 233, at 67 ("In the decades following the Declaration of
Independence in 1776, the United States found itself involved in several wars and
presented with the possibility of others, even after the long struggle with Britain over
independence was resolved with the Treaty of Paris in 1783.").
267. Id. at ch. III.
268. See generally cases discussed supra notes 205-215 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 231-245 and accompanying text.
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erican ambitions and goals."' Such factors "led courts to increasing
protection of national interests at the expense of international
ones."
271
5. Countervailing Historical Developments. Although this brief
overview of the evolution of international political thought in the
United States judiciary is forced to make generalizations about
changing judicial attitudes in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, it at least demonstrates that many different factors have con-
tributed to the judiciary's unwillingness to apply customary inter-
national law. At the least, it serves to demonstrate that criticisms of
customary international law based on historical evidence are sus-
pect bases for rejecting a modem application of customary interna-
tional law.
Further, there is substantial evidence that these factors are no
longer legitimate reasons for refusing to apply customary interna-
tional law. Traditional notions of absolute sovereignty have been
discarded in the aftermath of the Second World War. Beginning with
the trials at Nuremburg and continuing on with the founding of the
United Nations, the United States has played the leading role in
limiting the concept of the absolute rights of states.272 The introduc-
tion of the "rule of law" into the international system is largely a
product of American efforts and beliefs. Further, the United States
has played a tremendous role in developing the current system of
international law, creating a body of law that is largely a reflection
of American interests and philosophies. 3
Perceptions that international law impedes American interests
no longer have any validity in practice. International law is cur-
rently slanted to favor those countries which emerged from the Sec-
ond World War with increased resources and territories.2 4 Prohibi-
tions against uses of force275 and the movements towards free trade
and open seas have led to increasing power and riches for the United
States. As such, judicial applications of international law to repudi-
ate political branch action would not be detrimental to the interests
270. Dickinson, II, supra note 231, at 818-20.
271. Lobel, supra note 195, at 1114.
272. Id. at 1074.
273. Id.
274. There is little doubt that Western countries, specifically the United States,
emerged from World War II with the power to reshape the international system. The he-
gemonic power wielded by the United States in creating the United Nations, opening up
borders to trade, and guaranteeing the freedom of the seas, has resulted in an interna-
tional system that aids American interests. As such, it is untenable to argue that inter-
national law would act, in any general or pervasive sense, as an impediment to American
ambitions and interests.
275. U.N. CHARTER 2(4).
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of the United States as an international actor.
B. Theoretical Arguments
Thus far, this Article has centered on historical discussions of
the place of customary international law in American jurisprudence.
It has shown that history alone is an inadequate basis for rejecting
modern applications of international law. The only matters that re-
main to be answered are the theoretical objections which have been
raised to a modern application of customary international law. In
particular, some international law scholars have argued that its
application is anti-democratic, or violates the institutional principles
upon which this nation was founded.
1. The Lack of Democratic Legitimacy. It has forcefully been ar-
gued that customary international law has little or no place in the
American legal system, and that its application to invalidate actions
taken by either the legislature or the executive violates basic prin-
ciples of American democracy." 6 The attack against customary in-
ternational law as being anti-democratic has been carried on mainly
by Professor Phillip Trimble. Put simply, Trimble's argument is that
customary international law lacks "legitimacy" as a doctrine suitable for
judicial application. The principal reason is that its formulation cannot be
explained in a manner consistent with central features of traditionally ac-
cepted American political philosophy, and thus cannot be grounded in so-
cial values of the community subject to the law.277
Trimble's argument against the "legitimacy" of customary in-
ternational law is largely based on the manner in which it is formed.
As has been discussed above,278 customary international law is based
upon state practice. Trimble believes that a law created from such a
system cannot be reconciled with American political theory.
The basic tenet of American political philosophy, according to
Trimble, is that the government was formed to be responsive to the
people, and if it acts in a way that is not "responsible" or "accepted"
by the country's citizens, then its actions are illegitimate. 279 The fact
that customary international law is created separately from the Am-
erican political process is felt to be dispositive. The various aspects
276. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 86, at 665; Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1268.
277. Trimble, supra note 86, at 672-73.
278. See supra notes 90 - 91 and accompanying text.
279. The role of the court in maintaining its legitimacy in the American political
tradition is incumbent upon a recognition that "the power of a court is not unlimited, and
that an important limitation on that power is the acknowledged necessity ... to render
reasoned decisions based on traditional sources of legal doctrine." Trimble, supra note 86,
at 707 n.156.
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of this argument have been explicated by Professor Charney:281
Many cases bearing on the U.S. foreign relations concern questions of in-
ternational law. The mere fact that international law is involved may
serve as a basis for judicial deference or abstention. International law is
the product of a decentralized legal system without a legislature, an ex-
ecutive or a compulsory court system .... These [factors] lend support to
the view that U.S. courts should treat international law differently and
more politically than they do other law. If it is not "real" law, deference to
the executive branch would not breach the court's responsibility to find
and apply the law.28'
Professor Trimble adds one more element of illegitimacy to
customary international law by declaring that
[iun this intellectual universe, the idea of customary international law en-
counters substantial problems, because at least some of the potential
lawmakers, such as foreign governments, are neither representative of the
American community nor responsive to it. The foreign nature of these
sources of legal obligation cannot be reconciled with American political
philosophy .... [Clustomary international law has no basis in popular
sovereignty at all. Many foreign governments are not responsive to their
own people, let alone to the American people.
28 2
The final element of Trimble's illegitimacy argument is based
on the fact that customary international law is not something that
the American people have the opportunity to scrutinize and ulti-
mately reject if they so desire. Laws in the United States are passed
under tremendous public scrutiny and debate, and become "law"
only when the popularly elected officials vote them into effect.18 1
280. Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN
AFFAIlS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUION 98, 101 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
281. Id. Professor Trimble obviously concurs with Charney's description of the
problem when he concludes that customary international law lacks legitimacy and
"should never [be applied] except pursuant to political branch direction." Trimble, supra
note 86, at 716.
282. Trimble, supra note 86, at 721 (emphasis added).
283. The greatest danger, in Trimble's view, is that unlike treaties or statutes, de-
veloping "[clustomary international law ... may not be known to the legislature, or even
to most of the executive branch. In the most extreme case, a rule could evolve out of the
practice of foreign nations while remaining entirely unknown to all or most of the United
States government." Id. at 729.
This argument is ridiculous. For a norm of state practice to rise to the level of
customary international law, it is generally regarded that the practice must be wide-
spread (some argue nearly universal) and that states must follow that practice out of a
sense of legal obligation. The argument that widespread international practice could se-
cretly develop without the United States ever becoming aware of it until it was presented
with the new "law" in a courtroom assumes a State Department ineptness that even its
fiercest critics would have to be unwilling to consider.
In fact, it seems far more plausible that United States citizens will fall victim to
"stealth statutes" passed by their representatives in the legislature than that the United
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Thus, Trimble concludes that customary international law cannot be
considered a legitimate standard for judicial review of political
branch action because the law itself is opposed to American concep-
tions of democratic legalism."
Although this criticism carries some theoretical weight, it fails
to accurately account for the practical limitations placed upon the
development of customary international law. In particular, custom-
ary law is subject to the same political process as a treaty, which
every commentator agrees is law.
It is true that customary international law is based upon the
consistent practice of states, some of which may be anti-majoritarian
or anti-American in nature. Because of this, customary norms may
hypothetically emerge which would be antithetical to United States
interests.8 5 However, even if such a norm were to evolve, the United
States may always avoid being obligated to follow it. A state is not
bound by a customary norm "if it rejected that principle during the
process of its development."" 6 Thus, barring of course Professor
Trimble's "stealth norm," just as a nation may avoid accepting in-
ternational obligations by refusing to ratify or sign a treaty, so too
can it avoid an application of a customary norm by objecting to it
during its creation. 87
Further, the political reality of the current international order
is that it is largely dominated by the interests of the United States.
As such, it is highly unlikely that international law norms which
could be applicable by United States courts will diverge from the
interests of the United States.88 Thus, the conflict envisioned by the
arguments above is arguably negligible. In reality, "[tihe United
States will be affected by "stealth" customary international law!
284. Trimble argues that:
[e]volving norms of customary international law do not receive the scrutiny that
a proposed statute or treaty would receive within the executive branch, within
Congress, or among concerned members of the American public. Denied this
process, these norms are not supported by the mythology of popular consent ....
[Thus,] a customary norm has a much weaker political foundation [than other
laws] ....
Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
285. The importance and influence of the United States on developing international
law would seem to preclude this possibility for the near future. Certainly, some custom-
ary norms may emerge which are not as favorable as the United States may wish, but the
idea that an international norm could evolve into a binding norm of customary interna-
tional law, while also being antithetical to the American "way of life," or "democracy," is
highly unlikely.
286. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1566 n.38 (1984).
287. David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 957, 969 (1986).
288. Id.
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States continues to play a major role in international affairs and in
the development of international law. With very few exceptions, the
international law in force today is the product of U.S. efforts and is
heartily endorsed by the United States."2 9 If the United States con-
sidered an international norm to be detrimental to its interests, it
seems likely that the government would have objected to the crea-
tion of that law, and would thus be immune to its application. In
cases where such opposition is missing, the wisest course of action
would be to assume that the political branches chose not to opt out of
the obligation, and that the law is effectively binding and should be
applied by the courts in carrying out their "duty... to say what the law
"s .290
2. The Absence of Judicial Restraint. The second theoretical
claim against customary international law is grounded in presup-
positions about the role of the judiciary in the American democratic,
federalist, and separated system of government. It has been argued
that an application of customary international law against the gov-
ernment by the judiciary would constitute judicial "law-making."
Such an argument makes basic assumptions, both about the role of
the judiciary in the American system and the "non-traditional" na-
ture of customary international law. The thrust of this attack incor-
porates aspects of Professor Trimble's "undemocratic" assault with
more traditional criticisms of the judiciary as a non-democratic in-
stitution with very limited powers of review over the other branches
of government.
The role of the judiciary in American society is a matter of
widespread debate and disagreement. Generally, the debate focuses
on the "non-democratic" nature of the judiciary, as opposed to the
"democratic" nature of the elected branches. 2 9' The argument is
usually phrased in the following manner: since we as a society be-
lieve in the importance and desirability of democratic decision
making, we are naturally suspicious of the non-elected judiciary;
paradoxically, we also believe that the judiciary is endowed with the
responsibility for constraining the actions of the government. Thus,
the only legitimate basis for making determinations as to when the
elected branches should be left unchecked and when they should be
289. Charney, supra note 280, at 103.
290. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
291. See Trimble, supra note 86, at 707 ("[Ihe first and most basic question
[concerning the power of the courts] is how to justify the law-making authority of
unelected judges in a 'democratic' society."); Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1268 (claiming
that the judiciary's disuse of customary international law "obviously reflects a belief that
policy choices not fixed in the Constitution are properly left to the branches of the go-
vernment directly responsible to the people..."). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEmTING OF AMERICA (1987).
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constrained by the judiciary is found in the Constitution.292
In the Constitution, it is argued, the judiciary is directed to
make decisions that affect the elected branches according to its role
in the system of "checks and balances". For the courts to exercise
their power to "check" political branch excesses, they must ground
their decisions in principle, i.e., in the Constitution.93
Principle requires the courts to justify their decisions with
traditional doctrines. By requiring a principled decision, and by al-
lowing the political branches to ignore unprincipled decisions, the
courts are effectively limited from expanding their power beyond
that originally envisioned in the Constitution. According to its crit-
ics, however, "no such inhibition applied to the development of cus-
tomary international law."2 94 Customary international law changes
without regard to principle; it is based on national self-interest.295 As
such, an application of that law by the judiciary would be an
expansion of power without principle, and thus illegitimate.
However, the belief that an application of customary interna-
tional law is necessarily unconstitutional and outside the realm of
292. Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1237:
[Tihe force of a common-law rule depends on the authority of the court that
adopted it .... Moreover, if an institution is competent to promulgate rules only
in certain circumstances, then those rules necessarily apply only in those cir-
cumstances... [and] only one source can authorize lawmaking by federal
courts: The Constitution.
Id.
Professor Trimble offers the following argument:
ET]he power of a court is not unlimited, and... an important limitation on that
power is the acknowledged necessity (for whatever reasons) to render reasoned
decisions based on traditional sources of legal doctrine .... [Other] limitations
on the exercise of judicial authority [are] ... those inherent in the case-by-case
approach, the availability of appeals, and the prospect of legislative rever-
sal ....
Trimble, supra note 86, at 707 & n.156. Professor Trimble offers an example of the type of
judicial decisionmaking that fails to base itself on what he calls "traditional sources of le-
gal doctrine."
[If the courts order the executive branch to release a prisoner because it says
his constitutional rights have been violated, the order would routinely be obeyed
by government officials and accepted by the American political community....
On the other hand, if the court ordered the release of the same prisoner because
the judge saw three crows cross the full moon the night before the decision, the
order would probably not be obeyed .... I believe that customary international
law is more like the story of the crows than the explanation based on the Consti-
tution.
Id. at 718 (emphasis added). Exactly how this demonstration illuminates the discussion is
never fully articulated.
293. Trimble, supra note 86, at 708 ("One of the most important limitations lies in a
judicial commitment to render 'principled' decisions.").
294. Id. at 708-09.
295. Id.; see also Weisburd, supra note 224, at 1239-51.
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judicial legitimacy is not as self-evident as the critics of customary
international law seem to believe. Customary international law, as a
source of law, is not anathema to the democratic system; neither is
judicial review of political branch actions. This practice has been an
accepted component of the United States system of government
since the creation of the Union. Federal common law and the use of
judicial review are both explicit examples of the legislative powers of
the judiciary. To argue that the mere substitution of international
common law for domestic common law somehow alters the delicate
balance between Constitutional action and unconstitutional action is
untenable.
Further, customary international law is only applicable to
states which have chosen29 to have it applied to them. As such, the
courts would only be finding and applying that law which the politi-
cal branches are necessarily required to follow. Such review of politi-
cal branch action would do much to restore the United States to the
realm of legal conduct, and would help curb the excesses of individ-
ual administrations in their conduct of foreign affairs.2 9 Much of
this Article has been devoted to showing how the Framers intended
to have the judiciary keep the political branches in line with inter-
national law. Applications of that law would go far to returning the
United States judiciary to its rightful place in the "separation of
powers" system of government envisioned by the Framers.
Although Constitutional arguments have been leveled against
an application of customary international law as being violative of
the "separation of powers" doctrine, the most likely effect of such an
application would be to return the government to its originally in-
tended system of "checks and balances." However, it has been
pointed out that
[olften, courts have good reason to hesitate when confronted with a claim
based on international law. Many such claims involve foreign sovereigns
or officials, or they raise difficult questions about the power of United
States courts to regulate behavior beyond the national borders; and a
judge might feel that to decide those issues would constitute a judicial in-
trusion into the United States' foreign relations.298
The wisdom of this declaration is evident. Although customary
international law must be readily applied, there are specific in-
stances where it would be violative of not only the United States'
system of government, but also of common sense. As such, the po-
litical questions doctrine must not be stripped of its usefulness as a
296. Either through an express adherence or through neglect.
297. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
298. Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State
Governments, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1269 (1991).
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prudential tool allowing the judiciary to avoid deciding cases where
it is either unequipped to decide, or would be invading upon the
Constitutional realms of the other branches of government.299 Cus-
tomary international law is not a suicide pact, and does not force the
judiciary to alter governmental action in each and every circum-
stance. At the same time, however, the Constitution does not give
the executive branch the power to ignore all international obliga-
tions without fear of judicial review.0
3. Countervailing Arguments. The preceding sections have
shown that historical and theoretical objections to a modern appli-
cation of customary international law are not dispositive. Since the
judiciary is not precluded from applying customary international
law by the Constitution, history, or political theory, the only remain-
ing question to be answered is whether the judiciary should begin
applying it. The answer is clearly yes, for a number of reasons.
First, there is the fact that much of international law since the
Second World War has been created and fostered under the aus-
pices, and to the benefit, of the United States. Judicial applications
of international law have the possibility of continuing to solidify and
evolve that process.
Second, the decisions of domestic tribunals, as evidence of state
practice, can have a significant impact on the further development of
international law.3 0' Increased participation of the domestic judici-
ary in international law cases will aid in the development of inter-
national law in accordance with the interests of the United States.
299. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Questions Doc-
trine, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 280, at 107, 112-13:
To permit the Executive to proceed unencumbered by judicial review would
work a radical reallocation of constitutional power. If the Court declines to in-
tervene when the Executive poses a fundamental threat to the separation of
powers, the Executive, not the judiciary, becomes the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of the Constitution. Judicial abstention in such circumstances is un-
justified .... [T]he political system is incapable of reestablishing an equilibrium
of power, and the courts must step in to restore it.
Id.
300. See id. at 114 ("T]he political question doctrine can serve to perpetuate, rather
than alleviate, conflicts between the political branches and to impede the ability of the
United States to speak with a unified voice."); Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of Do-
mestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970). Professor Lilli-
ch believes very strongly in the impropriety of the widespread use of the political ques-
tions doctrine in foreign affairs cases: "T]he courts must ultimately reassess the prece-
dents by which international law ... is accorded second class status.... If the Supreme
Court is unwilling or unable even to approach this issue, then surely the possibility of an
amendment to the Constitution requires discussion." Id. at 50.
301. See CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-103
(1965).
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Third, United States attempts to foster the rule of law in other
nations have been seriously hampered by this country's refusal to be
bound by the very proscriptions it espouses. This country's return to
international legitimacy, even if through judicial imposition, would
go far to strengthening the rule of law in international relations-a
development that can only support American interests.
Finally, the disproportionate effect that this country's actions
have upon the development of international law is another factor
compelling the judiciary to enforce legitimacy. The incorporation of
this law into United States constitutional discourse could have im-
portant ramifications. Such an incorporation could simultaneously
strengthen the body of customary international law and make it
easier for other nations to identify and enforce this law. Once these
laws are made explicit it will become more difficult for violations to
occur.
30 2
CONCLUSION
Alvarez-Machain represents a supreme failure of the United
States judiciary. The reasoning behind the decision is inept and its
holding is arguably immoral. However, its greatest failure can be
found in its inability to grasp the consequences of allowing the ex-
ecutive branch to violate international law.
The law of nations was intended to be applicable to the United
States. The Framers of the Constitution not only created the federal
judiciary in large part to ensure its application, but the early Su-
preme Court did in fact apply it. The Alvarez-Machain Court's en-
dorsement of executive power to ignore customary international law
is antithetical to the purpose of an independent federal judiciary,
and is also indicative of a larger problem-the withdrawal of the
judiciary from issues that involve foreign policy. Essentially, the ju-
diciary has abandoned its responsibility.
Difficulty in ascertaining customary law should not be a bar to
its application. Courts have long been prepared to deal with
non-codified law. Arguably, the greatest barrier to applying inter-
national law is the ignorance of the United States judiciary about
the sources and effect of that law. Although this is obviously a diffi-
culty, it seems to be professional cowardice to declare that it should
be dispositive in determining the worth and validity of international
law. If the United States judiciary is ignorant of international law,
then education is the answer, not abandonment of the judicial func-
tion.
302. See Linda A. Stagno, The Application of International Human Rights Argu-
ments in United States Courts: Customary International Law Incorporated Into American
Domestic Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INTIL L. 207 (1982).
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In 1990, during the early days of the Gulf Crisis, President
Bush addressed the Congress, proclaiming "a new partnership of
nations" and predicting a time when "the rule of law supplants the
rule of the jungle.""3 Though President Bush obviously envisioned
the United States as the motivating force behind his "new world or-
der," subsequent actions by this country have seriously affected our
credibility as a member of the "family of nations." An increased, but
prudential, application of customary international law to review
foreign policy actions would go far in returning the United States to
a place of legitimacy in the international community. Only then will
this country leave "the savage state" and return to the community of
civilized nations.
303. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Vows to Thwart Iraq Despite Fear for Hostages; U.S.
Won't be 'Blackmailed," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1990, at Al, A21; see also Transcript of
President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, id. at A20.
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